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FEDERAL FAIRNESS TO STATE TAXPAYERS:
IRRATIONALITY, UNFUNDED MANDATES,
AND THE "SALT" DEDUCTION
Brian Galle*
By sheer dollars alone, the largest impact of the Alternative Minimum Tax is
to deny many taxpayers the deduction for the taxes they paid to their state
and local governments under § 164 of the Internal Revenue Code. This Article provides a fine-grainedanalysis of the overall fairness of the state-andlocal-tax deduction--and,by implication, the fairness of its partial repeal
through the Alternative Minimum Tax. I offerfor the first time a close examination of how newly understood limits on taxpayer mobility and rationality
might affect individuals' choices of bundles of local taxes and localgovernment services, which in turn informs our assessment of the 'fairness"
of those exchanges. Many of these lessons can be generalized to consumer
choices more generally. In addition, I track the reciprocalbenefits and burdens that flow between the national government and local governmentsagain, although the influx or outgo of billions of dollars surely affects how
the federal tax system should account for the outputs of local government,
scholars have neglected that question. Finally, I note that § 164, and therefore the Alternative Minimum Tax, can have serious effects on federal-state
relations, such that the debate over both provisions is in many ways a debate
not only overfairness but also aboutfederalism.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about a single provision of the U.S. Tax Code-§ 164, the
deduction for state and local taxes paid ("SALT"). In the tradition of many
an introductory tax course, I look through the keyhole of the SALT deduction into some of the deeper mysteries of tax theory. In particular, by
evaluating the fairness of § 164, I illustrate the difficulties of relying on
utilitarian or welfare theory as a guide to tax policy. I also draw out some
novel connections between the Internal Revenue Code and the relationship
between the states and the federal government.
The SALT deduction has risen to prominence with the increasing significance of the Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT"). The AMT is likely the
most important practical tax issue facing individual Americans today.' In a
few short years, the cost of repealing the AMT will exceed the cost of repealing the rest of the individual income tax. 2 As of this writing, AMT
reform is the leading tax goal, and one of the top overall legislative priorities, for the Democratic majority in both houses.3 Although the politics and
impressive budget numbers of the AMT have gotten much ink, few have
discussed the AMT from the perspective of tax theory. The vast bulk of taxpayers affected by the AMT fall into its grasp because it prevents them from

claiming deductions to which they would otherwise be entitled, particularly
4 One way to theodeductions for taxes paid to state and local governments.
•
5
rize the AMT, then, is as the sum of these constituent parts.
1. The AMT, I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (2000), is a parallel tax system to the ordinary individual
income tax, intended originally to ensure that high-earning individuals able to claim many large
deductions would nonetheless be obliged to pay a substantial amount of tax. See MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ, DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 113 (1997). For a more detailed background,
see The Alternative Minimum Tax, REVENUE & TAX POL'Y BRIEF (Cong. Budget Office, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 15, 2004, available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5386/04-15-AMT.pdf;
Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT. Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105, 106-115
(2003) [hereinafter Burman et al., Projections];and Leonard E. Burman et al., The Individual AMT:
Problems and PotentialSolutions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 555, 555-96 (2002).
2.

The Alternative Minimum Tax, supra note 1,at 2.

3. Edmund L. Andrews, DemocratsSeek to Lead the Way in Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2007, at AI: Steven R. Weisman, Rangel Offering Broad Tax Plan, and Big Target, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2007, atAl.
4. The AMT works by obliging a taxpayer to recompute her tax using a different standard
deduction amount and omitting most of the individualized deductions she ordinarily could claim.
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii). The deduction for state and local tax is among the most important of the
deductions that must be omitted in this recalculation. See Kim Rueben, The Impact of Repealing
State And Local Tax Deductibility,37 ST. TAX NOTES 497, 498 (2005).
5. See Burman etal., Projections,supra note 1,at 115 (observing that, in order to take true
measure of the horizontal equity of the AMT, analysts would have to consider its effect on the major
deductions it impedes); Beverly I. Moran, Stargazing: The Alternative Minimum Taxfor Individuals
and Future Tax Reform, 69 ORE. L. REV. 223, 240-68 (1990) (arguing that the AMT cannot be
justified on its own and instead is a sort of laboratory for testing out a tax scheme in which its pro-
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The SALT deduction is perhaps the most theoretically imposing component of the AMT. Debate over the SALT deduction is not new. Prior
analyses, however, have made two major assumptions that render them
rather suspect. First, they have assumed that taxpayers respond to financial
incentives, such as their local tax systems, in a way that is wholly rational.
Second, they have assumed (at times for the sake of simplicity) that the
states' receipt of billions of dollars in federal grants and federally imposed
burdens do not affect state and local taxing and spending decisions, a proposition that is clearly untrue. What I add here is a fine-grained analysis of the
deduction once these assumptions are removed.
To begin, it is useful to understand the scope of the deduction and its
historic rationales. Commentators over the years have urged Congress to
grant taxpayers a deduction for the taxes they pay to their state and local
6
governments. Proponents have said that the deduction is necessary to treat
fairly taxpayers hailing from jurisdictions that impose different taxes.' The
argument has succeeded. The annual budget cost of § 164-the provision
providing individuals and corporations with a deduction for the state and
local income, property, and (in some instances) sales taxes they paytotaled about $75 billion in one recent counting.' Yet the provision remains
controversial, with some prominent calls-including from the President's
Advisory Panel on Tax Reform-for its repeal. 9
When proponents say that the deduction is necessary to treat taxpayers
fairly, they mean to invoke one of the basic norms of the tax system, the
notion of horizontal equity-the claim that the tax system should treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly.' ° Under the traditional view of § 164, two
hibitions apply more broadly). To my knowledge, Linda Beale is the only scholar who has attempted, albeit briefly, to sum up the fairness implications of the AMT. Linda M. Beale, Congress
Fiddles While Middle America Bums: Amending the AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811,
817-76 (2004).
6.

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL

YEARS 2003-2007, at 20, 27 (2002).

7. WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 18-24 (1947); Henry Aaron,
What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543, 543-44 (1969); Beale, supra
note 5, at 861-66; see also Rueben, supra note 4, at 498 (noting that proponents of the deduction
continue to raise this argument).

8. I.R.C. § 164; see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 27. The 2008 budget cost
of permitting AMT taxpayers to deduct state and local taxes is estimated at $75 billion.
9.

Ian Urbina, Bush Plan Could Imperil Tax Write-Offfor New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,

2004, at BI; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PROGROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 70, 83-84 (2005), available at http://
www.taxreformpanel .gov/final-report/TaxReform Ch5 .pdf.
10.
The term originates with the public-finance economist Richard Musgrave. RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959); Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an
Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1967). Scholars before and after Musgrave have described the same concept in slightly different terminology. E.g., A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC
FINANCE 44 (3d rev. ed. 1962) (analyzing "equal sacrifice among similar and similarly situated
persons"); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 30 (1938) ("[Tiax burdens should bear

similarly upon persons whom we regard as in substantially similar circumstances....").
There has been an ongoing debate in the scholarly tax community over whether horizontal equity is an important norm on its own or whether instead it is simply a placeholder for other societal
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people who make the same amount of money are not equal if one pays more
state tax than the other." Thus the federal tax system should favor the higher
state-tax payer. Later critics argued that this was considering only half the
apple (or half the orange): state taxes generate services, which increase taxpayer well-being. 2 So, the critics said, the higher tax payer, like a consumer
who buys a product at retail, has less money in her pocket at the end of the
year but is just as well-off as the taxpayer with more money but fewer services. 3 Further analysis by Harvard's Louis Kaplow showed that the equity

question might turn on complicated empirical questions of who truly bore
the burden of a given state tax-was
it true, in other words, that taxpayers
4
got everything they paid for?
This Article argues that the analyses both of Kaplow and the literature
he critiques are incomplete. First, both sides of the horizontal-equity debate

have so far assumed that an individual's subjective well-being is best measured by the choices she makes in the marketplace. An increasing body of
literature, however, shows that we often make choices as a result of our misvalues. For proponents of horizontal equity, see, for example, Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax
Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399,
451-53 (2005) [hereinafter, Dodge, Theories]; Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and
Pass-Through Corporate-ShareholderIntegration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 275 n.42 (1995);
David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principleof Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 87-88
(2006) (arguing that horizontal equity could be defended using some general theories of justice);
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnik, Tax and the Philosopher's Stone, 89 VA. L. REV. 647,
656-57, 667-68 (2003); Richard A. Musgrave, HorizontalEquity: A FurtherNote, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
354 (1993); and Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113-22
(1990). Critics include CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BORIS I. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? 128-29 (1969); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP

37-38, 99 (2002); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L
TAX J. 139, 139-54 (1989); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontaland Vertical Equity:
The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 611, 621-22 (1993); and David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1646-48
(1999). In this Article, I assume that equal treatment of similarly situated individuals is an important
norm in its own right. I acknowledge, however, that our efforts here to measure whether two individuals are "similar" in a meaningful sense may suggest that the endeavor as a whole faces some
fundamental difficulties. See infra text accompanying notes 195-236.
VICKREY, supra note 7, at 18-24; Aaron, supranote 7, at 543-44; Beale, supra note 5, at

11.

861-66.
12.
FOR

See U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS

FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY: GENERAL EXPLANATION 63 (1984), available at

http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform/pres85All.pdf;
2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: GENERAL EXPLANATION

OF

THE

TREASURY

DEPARTMENT

PROPOSALS

63

(1984),

available at

http://

www.treasury.gov/offices/tax-policylibrary/tax-reform/tres84v2All.pdf
[hereinafter
TREASURY
REPORT]; Brookes D. Billman & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local Taxes: The
Case for Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES 1107, 1111-12 (1985): Charles R. Hulten & Robert M.
Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebout Comprehensive Income Tax, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 67, 68-71 (1991);
Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalismand the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes under the Federal
Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1996); J.B. McCombs, A New FederalTax Treatment of State
and Local Taxes, 19 PAC. L.J. 747, 754 (1988); Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A
Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1985); see also Daniel
Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalismin Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 907-08
(1992).
13.

2

14.

See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 490.

TREASURY REPORT,

supra note 12, at 63; Hulten & Schwab, supra note 12, at 68-71.
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perception of what would best satisfy our own preferences.' 5 Cognitive biases also limit our ability to process market information accurately.' 6 These
biases undermine a key assumption of the equity critique of the deductionthat taxpayers are able to freely align themselves in jurisdictions where tax
levels match their preference for services. States may play on these biases in
order to export the costs of their own services onto their neighbors.
Further, the equity critique so far has neglected the relationship between
ihe states and the federal government. States often must pay to comply with
federal mandates; they also receive grants from Congress, some subject to
costly conditions. In theory, an imbalance one way or the other between
what a state receives and what it must expend might be the basis for an inclusion or deduction. As I show, however, it proves exceedingly difficult to
find any administrable metric to sort unwanted costs from desired services,
interstate bribes, or regulations that have bite only on paper.
These conclusions have significant implications for ongoing policy debates, especially those concerning the AMT. For example, they may
(depending on as yet unmeasured empirical data) undermine some of the
President's Advisory Panel's arguments for eliminating § 164. That suggests, in turn, that we should take more seriously the call for AMT "reform,"
at least to the extent that we want to prevent the AMT from further eroding
the SALT deduction.
The SALT deduction also has very significant effects on the relationship
between the states and the federal government. I have detailed elsewhere
some of the deduction's consequences at the level of state and local government. ' 7 I explain here how the choice of whether or not to allow the
deduction may have the effect of shifting power to or away from the federal
government. Economists have described (although lawyers have generally
not noticed) how the SALT deduction permits larger state spending, and
might arguably reduce federal spending. But deductibility has additional
consequences when combined with federal power to attach conditions to
federal grants. That power often serves as a tool for allowing states to negotiate with one another to reduce collective-action costs. Deductibility
sometimes raises the costs of these negotiations, an outcome that is more or
less attractive depending on how highly we value state diversity. Thus the
AMT, by way of its influence on the SALT deduction, may have a hidden
impact on federal-state fiscal relations. We must first judge how we feel
about those relations before we judge this aspect of the AMT.
Part I of this Article sets out in more detail the mechanics, history, and
theoretical underpinnings of § 164, explaining that the most basic question
15. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 633 (1999); Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax 2-4 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Olin Research Paper No. 04-13 &
Univ. S. Cal., CLEO Research Paper No. C04-10, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=567767.
16.

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 15, at 3.

17. Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section
164 of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673 (2007).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:805

we face is whether state and local taxes make local taxpayers better or worse
off. Part II recomputes this calculus in light of the fact that taxpayers may
often choose their bundle of taxes and services irrationally. Part III similarly
suggests some adjustments we must make to obtain taxpayers' desired mix
of benefits and burdens in light of what we know about the limits on taxpayer freedom to relocate. Part IV expands our scope to take in federal
transfers to and from states. Part V then addresses a residual problem raised
by the analysis of Part IV: what should we do if it appears that, in order to

be "fair" to taxpayers, we must interfere with the efficiency prescriptions of
public-finance economics? Part VI attempts to solve some of the tensions
and contradictions of the earlier Parts by reconceiving the notion of equal

welfare itself. Perhaps we might reach more satisfying results if we measure
not the subjective, perceived utility of each individual but instead an objective, as-if, or hypothetical utility of a more fully informed and rational
taxpayer. That leaves us with the question of whether welfare, measured on
those terms, is really welfare at all. Further, I suggest that these efforts to
reimagine utility theory may prove fruitless, leaving us to wonder whether
horizontal equity, or welfarism more generally, can be a useful tool of tax

policy.
I. BACKGROUND
The federal deduction for state and local taxes paid is long on
pedigree-it is as ancient as the federal income tax itself." For much of its
life, however, it has been short on theoretical justification. Congress's only
modem explanation for the deduction has been a brief 1964 observation that
the deduction is necessary to prevent federal taxation from crowding out
state opportunities to tax the same base.' 9 That justification echoes the
original rationale offered in the first income tax act of 1862.20 It doesn't
make much sense, though, since the deduction applies to many sources of
revenue untapped by the federal government, such as property taxes and
sales taxes.2'

18. See Billman & Cunningham, supra note 12, at 1108; Rueben, supra note 4, at 498; U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of the U.S. Tax System, http://www.treas.gov/
education/fact-sheets/taxes/ustax.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (noting that the income tax of
1862 included deductions for "other taxes paid").
19. H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at 44-45 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 135758. I argue elsewhere that it is possible that overlapping state and federal tax bases in fact cause
crowd in of state tax rather than crowd out. Galle, supra note 17, at 702-09.
20. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Constitutional Dimensions of State and Local Tax Deductibilit)', 16 PUBLIus 71, 76 (1986) (citing floor statement of Rep. Justin Smith Morrill).
21. To be fair, Congress explained that its main concern was discouraging states from taxing
income and that it was making sales taxes deductible to avoid encouraging states to shift from sales
to income taxes. H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at 1357. However, studies show little or no change in states'
preferences for sales taxes in response to the federal deductibility of other tax options. Gilbert E.
Metcalf, Deductibility and Optimal State and Local Fiscal Policy, 39 ECON. LETTERS 217, 217, 219
(1992). Yet Congress now has reenacted sales-tax deductibility. I.R.C. § 164 (2000). If deductibility
does not, in fact, cause states to shift away from sales taxes, why are they deductible again?
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Commentators have suggested instead that the deduction can be viewed
as an aspect of fundamental tax fairness. In this view, § 164 is an equitable
measure intended to put on an equal footing those who earned similar in-

comes in jurisdictions with different tax rates .22 This claim trades on one of
the central tenets of tax policy, the notion of horizontal equity.2 3 A horizontally equitable tax system should leave two taxpayers who are similarly24
situated before a tax is imposed similarly situated after they have paid it.
For these purposes, we set 25
aside questions of redistribution of societal resources, or "vertical equity.
Although tax scholars and philosophers dispute how best to measure

what makes two taxpayers "similarly situated" for horizontal-equity purposes, one common claim is that the goal of the tax system is to equalize
utility, or individual sense of well-being. 26 Sometimes equal regard for utility may result in different treatment for individuals with the same income.

For instance, a healthy individual who earns $100,000 at her job might be
better off than her twin sister who was struck by a car and does not work but
receives a $100,000 tort settlement for pain and suffering. Arguably, the injured twin has merely been restored to her initial condition by the tort
payment, such that at the end of the transaction she is still $100,000 worth
of utility short of her sister. Thus the injured twin should be able to exclude

her tort settlement from her income or take a deduction for her pain and suf27
fering.

The 1964 Congress additionally justified retaining deductibility of the property tax as an effort
to avoid shifting the "distribution of Federal income taxes between homeowners and nonhomeowners." H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at 1357. It is hard to fathom what this might mean, other than perhaps
that Congress believed (counterfactually, for the most part) that landlords do not pass the costs of
property taxes on to their renters. See Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Homeownership Among Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 97, 107 (2007) ("[R]enters effectively pay the costs of mortgage interest and real property
taxes ....); Peter Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1098, 1125 (1989) (describing empirical data suggesting landlords are able to pass on property-tax
costs to renters). Contra Billman & Cunningham, supra note 12, at 1115 n.31 (noting the economic
debate on this point). Alternatively, Congress might have meant to suggest that there would be winners and losers from changing the deductibility rule, since current home prices would likely decline
in response to a loss of deductibility. See Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra, at 1127-31 (reviewing
evidence that home prices typically reflect costs and benefits of government services). Probably the
best reading of this passage is that Congress was acknowledging that the political opposition to
removing the deductibility of property taxes was too steep to overcome.
22.

See Burman et al., Projections,supra note I.

23. Horizontal equity bears that cumbersome name in order to distinguish it from vertical
equity, which is the tax-policy term for distributive justice. JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX
88(1989).
24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26. E.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 335-36 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 386-88 (1989).

27.

This theory of income was set out most famously in Andrews, supra note 26, at 313-15.
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Similarly, supporters of § 164 claim that paying state tax leaves the taxpayer less well-off than someone who doesn't pay state tax. Therefore, in

order to be fair to these state taxpayers, the federal system must treat those
who pay higher state tax more generously than those with equal incomes
who pay less. 2' That equity explanation flounders somewhat given that the
deduction is available only to itemizers rather than to everyone who paid
state tax.29
28.

See supra note 11.

29. See Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivit: Should the Federal Income
Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2004). Tax scholars
disagree as to whether utility is an appropriate ground for comparing different taxpayers. Many
commentators, noting the serious theoretical problems in making any but the broadest generalization
about individual utility, suggest instead that the fundamental measure of taxpayers should be their
"ability to pay." See HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 30-31 (1938); Joseph Bankman,
The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42
STAN. L. REV. 15, 40-42 (1989); Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Casefor a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 363-64 (1993); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV.
299, 301 n.1, 307-08 (2001); Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2
CHAP. L. REV. 157, 188-89 (1999); Richard A. Musgrave, ET OTandSBT, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 3, 5
(1976) (describing the intellectual history of economic approaches to horizontal equity); Eric M.
Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniforn Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 42 (1996). Ability to pay is typically defined as a taxpayer's access to money or other primary goods. Dodge, Theories, supra note
10, at 449-50; see also SIMONS, supra, at 49.
In response, some economists (and others) maintain that horizontal equity measured by income alone would be seriously flawed because it would neglect the role of individual preferences
for other goods, such as leisure. See WALTER J. BLUM & HENRY KALVEN, JR.,THE UNEASY CASE
FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 49-51 (4th ed. 1963) (describing the equal-sacrifice principle); DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 271-72 (1986); HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 345-48
(1995); Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 82-83 (1976); Harvey
S. Rosen, An Approach to the Study of Income, Utility and Horizontal Equity, 92 Q.J. ECON. 30710(1978).
Another potential problem with the ability-to-pay standard is its seeming inability to answer
certain policy questions. See Andrews, supra note 26, at 326-27; Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 78-79, 84, 143 (1996) (making this critique of both ability-to-pay and
utilitarian approaches); Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 407
(1993) (questioning whether ability-to-pay theorists can explain why they focus on income rather
than wealth or liquidity); Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 939-49 (2002); cf.
Griffith, supra note 26, at 346 (criticizing earlier theories of deductibility on the ground that they did
not by themselves supply any theory to explain what should be included in the concept of income).
Section 164 is a good illustration. Do I have a lesser ability to pay federal tax if I have also paid
state taxes? If I have chosen to pay state taxes, then I had an ability to pay either the state or the
federal government. Which should have the superior claim requires a theory not of tax but of federalism. We might argue that state taxes are not really chosen but are compulsory. That claim seems
inconsistent with the Constitution, see U.S CoNST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to states a republican
form of government), and, in any event, probably depends on a contestable theory of political philosophy outside the realm of tax.
A third difficulty of ability-to-pay theory that comes to the fore when we analyze § 164 is that
it does not by itself explain whether "imputed" income should be taxable. See Dodge, Theories,
supra note 10, at 449 n.203. That is, services that a taxpayer provides herself do not create primary
goods that could be distributed to others and therefore arguably should not be considered part of her
ability to contribute to the cost of government. See Andrews, supra note 26, at 326. On the other
hand, she may well have more income available for other consumption as a result, since she need
not pay someone else to build her deck or hum a soulful tune. See id. at 324.
We could apply a very similar analysis to the question of state and local taxes. As we will see
shortly, we can think of local taxes as a purchase of government services. Many of these services,
such as security or clean streets, could not easily be transferred to others. But they may also replace
essential services the taxpayer once provided for herself or free the taxpayer to use her available
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Contemporary commentators are skeptical of the equity argument on
other grounds as well. Their central insight is that state taxpayers get what
they pay for.3 ° Local taxes, for example, pay for schools, pothole filling,
road plowing, and other municipal services. Some local governments exact
much higher taxes, but they also spend much more on services, especially
education. State taxes provide for highways, statewide education grants, and
national guardsmen, to name a few. In this view, the equity argument melts

away. Two taxpayers earning equal salaries in different jurisdictions might
pay different tax rates, but they are still equally well-off.3 One has less
money in her pocket, but she also has purchased a set of services that leave
her better off than her counterpart in the low-tax jurisdiction." As we will
see, this turns out to be at best a very rough view of the actual picture of
tax-benefit tradeoffs. For now, though, I merely note that under the prevailing view, the equity justification for a deduction is fairly weak, especially if

one accounts for the administrative difficulties of more precise measures of
equity that depart from the assumption that services received equals taxes
paid.33

These arguments in turn were synthesized and hammered out in far
greater detail in a seminal 1996 article by Louis Kaplow.3 4 Professor Kaplow's view, although qualified, seems highly skeptical of the merits of the
deduction. The bulk of his analysis centers on the equity justification. He

observes that in a number of possible scenarios, some residents of a jurisdiction will pay, or through tax incidence effects35 will in effect pay, more than

dollars to acquire those services. Ability-to-pay theory assumes a certain base of income that should
be exempt from taxation to account for these necessities. If government provides or facilitates them,
it is arguable that this base amount should be reduced, resulting in a higher tax. Ability-to-pay theory thus has no clear answer to the question whether receipt of these additional services should
count as income, which might or might not completely offset the deduction for taxes paid.
Accordingly, although I acknowledge that ability-to-pay theory represents a major strand of
modem tax theory, I largely set it aside in this Article. However, my analysis should still be of interest to those who find ability to pay the most attractive metric, so long as they are willing to assume
that government services should count as income.
30.

See supra note 12.

31.

2

TREASURY

REPORT, supra note 12, at 63; Hulten & Schwab, supra note 12, at 68-71.

32. Largely for the sake of simplicity, I regard all state services as consumption. As I explain
later, some forms of state spending may or may not be seen as the equivalent of a consumer purchase, depending on one's political philosophy.
33. See Yorio, supra note 12, at 1281. Professor Zelinsky, on the other hand, would grant a
deduction for state taxes tied to state expenditures where the proper view of income would have
resulted in federal deductibility if the same expenditure had been made by an individual. Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and
Partial, Functional Deductibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9, 10-11 (1987).

34. Kaplow, supra note 12. A related set of arguments concern whether the deduction, if not
required out of any sense of fairness, might still be appropriate as a subsidy to the States. See Galle,
supra note 17, at 680-95; Rueben, supra note 4, at 498-99.
35.
Incidence is a term used by economists to describe where the actual financial burden of a
tax falls. For example, the unemployment tax is nominally paid by employers. But unless the market
for labor is highly inelastic, employers will simply reduce wages by the amount of the tax. Thus the
economic bite of the tax-its incidence-is on workers, not employers.
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they receive in benefits.3 6 Others will receive more and pay less. In theory,
we might allow a partial deduction for the first group and perhaps require an
inclusion to income for the second.37 That approach, however, would involve
difficult questions about how to value the services received by any particular
38
taxpayer.
Nor are all of the problems strictly practical. We ordinarily measure the
value of something by what an individual is willing to pay for it. 39 Living in
California is expensive, but the Golden State offers rewards other than government services to its beach-loving, winter-eschewing denizens. It might
therefore be the case that the individual in California paying high taxes is as
well-off as the one in Iowa paying little--even if the Californian receives
less in benefits than the taxes she pays, and the Iowan realizes an excess. 40
Thus Kaplow strongly suggests (without quite committing himself to the
position) that even if most of the administrability problems of valuation
could be solved, a partial-exclusion-partial-inclusion approach would not
solve the equity puzzle.4
Kaplow's analysis seems to rest on two questionable assumptions. First,
it equates the choice of a place of residence, and its accompanying package
of taxes and services, with a consumer purchase. 4' That may imply a view of
individuals who are at least somewhat mobile and informed about their
choice of living situations or who alternatively are immobile but aware of
the taxes and benefits of their own jurisdiction and possess the political
power to alter them. Second, Kaplow explicitly accepts the economist's assumption that the only realistic way to measure a taxpayer's subjective wellbeing is through market allocation of private choices.43 That is, modern
economists generally assume that the proper goal of policy is to maximize
satisfaction of the preferences individuals actually display in their market
decisions." It is, however, conceivable that these expressed preferences are
not, in some sense, individuals' true preferences, or at least are not preferences that the individuals would express in other contexts. 4 As a result,
scholars disagree over whether the economic tradition of taking expressed
36.

E.g., Kaplow, supranote 12, at 451-52, 459-60.

37.

Id. at 426.

38.

See id. at 431-34, 439.

39.

Id. at 432.

40.

See id. at 434, 440-41.

41.

See id. at 491.

42.

Id. at 432.

43.

See id. at 439.

44.

See, e.g., LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
140-41 (3d ed. 1984); William J. Baumol, Community Indifference, 14 REV. ECON. STUD.
44, 47-48 (1947); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 76-77 (1977).
SCIENCE

45.

See John C. Harsanyi, Utilities, Preferences, and Substantive Goods, 14 Soc. CHOICE
129, 130-35 (1997); Yew-Kwang Ng, From Preference to Happiness: Towards a More
Complete Welfare Economics, 20 Soc. CHOICE WELFARE 307, 308-12 (2003).

WELFARE
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preferences as• 46
given, without inquiring into their genuineness or motivation,
is worthwhile. Kaplow's approach therefore also implicitly assumes that
the choices made by taxpayers truly reflect their preferences and that these
expressed preferences, rather than some hypothetical or objective notion of
utility, provide the proper basis for measuring taxpayer well-being.47 One of
my aims over the remainder of this Article is to examine how durable
Kaplow's conclusions prove if these assumptions are challenged.
II. EQUITY AND COGNITIVE BIASES
The critique of the equity view of the SALT deduction depends in part
on the notion that consumers of state services are getting what they pay
for-or, if not, that the free choices of consumers are our best available
measure of subjective utility. Under this view, no deduction is appropriate
because we presume that each state taxpayer receives in exchange for her
taxes a package of benefits that, to her, is worth the price. Yet, we have increasingly begun to realize that taxpayer choices about where to live can be
distorted by common biases or mental mistakes. If these biases are predictable and cut consistently in a given direction, we might have a case for
designing tax rules to account for them. For example, if taxpayers consistently underestimate their taxes and so pay too much for their government
services, maybe they deserve a deduction. In Section II.A, I suggest that the
situation is not so clear cut; in Section II.B, I explore what the sensible legal
responses to that dilemma might be.
A. Do People Make Good Choices?
One potential challenge for the critique arises out of the relatively recent
integration of cognitive psychology with economics and other theories of
regulation. Cognitive psychologists have shown that individuals are not perfectly rational in their market decisions.4 Rather, we each are prone to a
number of tendencies and habits of mind, probably none insuperable, but
which nonetheless sometimes lead us to perceive the world other than as a
traditional economic view would suggest.49 One prominent example of these
46. Compare Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL.
159, 164-65 (1986); Harsanyi, supra note 45, at 134; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 380-83 (1998);

and Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced
Utility 2-3 (Dec. 1, 2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfmabstractid=870494, with Stigler & Becker, supra note 44, at 78-89.
47. Kaplow notes in his other work that an ideal measure of utility might properly consider
hypothetical guesses about what individuals would want if perfectly rational. See Louis Kaplow, A
Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 497, 504

(1995). He does not develop that idea in any great depth and does not raise it in his discussion of
§ 164. See id.
48.

See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 643-86; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Ap-

proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-79 (1998).

49.

See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 645-46, 672.
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tendencies, or "cognitive biases," is the endowment effect: individuals value
an object or entitlement they own more than they would value the same
property in the hands of someone else.50 We fear losses more than we wel-

come equivalent gains." These biases
may have a substantial impact on
52

decisions about risk and investment.
In addition to the endowment effect, two other general forms of bias are
particularly important to the equity of state and local taxes. The first is the
so-called isolation effect.53 In making a decision or solving a problem, we

tend to concentrate most of our attention on only the most immediate or
obvious aspect of the decision, and we have difficulty integrating our feelings about that aspect with other (in theory relevant) aspects that are further

from the center of our attention.54 We look at two streams of money flowing
into one account as separate, even though money is, in reality, completely
fungible. 5 One set of researchers found that in public-finance decisions in
particular, subjects consistently disaggregated one tax from another or from
correlative spending proposals 56 : even if the subjects wanted an overall pro-

gressive tax system, they would resist adjusting one tax or spending
program to make up for regressiveness in another tax.57 Similarly, "subjects
seem[ed] willing to consider higher taxes if there [were] more smaller
taxes. 58

50. Id. at 674-76; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625-30 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous
Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 225-27 (1993) (summarizing studies).
51.
See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 675; Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 EONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) (showing that
the value function for losses is steeper than the value function for gains).

52.

W. Kip Viscusi,

FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK

150 (1992); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 688-89; Sunstein, supra note 50, at 227. Theorists
have also described countervailing effects that return markets to what they would look like if comprised entirely of strictly rational actors. The correctives, however, generally depend on the presence
of an effective market. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1657 (1998).
53.

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 15, at 4.

54. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution
(Univ. S. Cal., CLEO Research Paper No. C05-4, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-8, & Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 05-8 & Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 05I1,2005), available at http://ssrn.coln/abstract=695305.
55. Jolls, supra note 52, at 1669; Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and
Mental Accounts, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-201 (1990); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures
Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax
Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 804 (2005).
56.
at 390.
57.

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 54, at 26-28; see also Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 46,
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 15, at 24, 27.

58. Id. at 26. I report these results with the usual caution that laboratory tests of economic
behavior may not perfectly predict real-world behavior.
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Another important bias is sometimes called the anchoring effect.59 It
causes us to judge the appropriate size of a numerical change by reference
to some existing value of which we are already aware. 6 For example, in the
public-finance experiments, subjects who wanted a very progressive tax
structure would suggest more progressive systems when starting with a system that was already somewhat progressive and vice versa. 6 ,
These tendencies are significant to the equity argument because they
suggest that taxpayers don't always match taxes to services. Most obviously,
the isolation effect implies that taxpayers will generally not choose where
they live based on a complete evaluation of the benefits and burdens of taxation, regulation, and government services. Instead they are likely to focus on
only one or two of the most prominent factors and use that measure as a
heuristic-a shorthand device they assume is adequate to stand in for the
62
complex tradeoffs that in theory ought to underlie choices of residency.
Thus, for example, small businesses often choose to move from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction based on the operators' sense of whether one spot or another
is "business friendly," a gestalt measure that seems to rest largely on business tax rates or other very prominent regulatory features.63
The isolation effect is compounded by the large menu of potential government services. In theory, any particular jurisdiction could choose to
deliver an almost infinite combination of taxes and services. 64 But for the
most part, we either don't have or are unwilling to exercise the processing
power to compare such long lists of choices, even assuming that we could
65
costlessly acquire that information.
Endowment and anchoring effects also can irrationally limit a citizen's
willingness to move. Taxpayers might overvalue the benefits they are already receiving and frame their analysis of competing jurisdictions with the
existing state of affairs in their current homes. A new tax-benefit package
that departed radically from the existing set could look like it "goes too far"
even if the taxpayer, if she lived in the second jurisdiction, would have preferred it to the first. And additional taxes in a different jurisdiction might be
seen as a "loss" to be avoided, even though they allow countervailing
59. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 667; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 1177 (2003).
60. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 667-68; Sunstein & Thaler. supra note 59, at
1177-78.
61.

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 54, at 42; McCaffery & Baron, supra note 15, at 25-26.

62. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 662; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
63. See George R. Karvel et al., Minnesota Business Migration: Relocation, Expansion, and
Formation in Border States, AM. EXPERIMENTAL Q., Summer 1998, at 67.
64. Cf William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 223-24 (1997)
(arguing that public goods may be bundled together in so many different ways that only a republic
with as many jurisdictions as people could ensure a perfect match between all of an individual's
preferences and the services his or her jurisdiction provides).
65.

See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 59, at 1196-97.
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gains. 66 In short, citizens will sometimes fail to recognize that an alternative
package of taxes and benefits would better satisfy their preferences.
Overall, the general trend of the biases I've described is toward overpayment. For instance, by overestimating the benefit of current services and
failing to integrate the negative effect of several small taxes, a taxpayer
might remain in a state where she pays considerably more than she is actually getting. It seems rather harder to construct a story in which biases might
produce a consumer surplus. 67
On the other hand, biases are probably not inevitable. Research suggests
that subjects can be debiased6 : we can educate ourselves to recognize factors that may be distorting our calculations. In addition, of course, some
taxpayers may seek counseling from attorneys, accounting firms, financial
consultants, or other money mavens. Careful counseling can lay bare the
real tradeoffs between different sets of taxes and available services.
The question, then, is what to make of these potentially conflicting data.
Importantly, the fact of distortions in taxpayer decisions does not itself answer the question of fairness. We might also ask how we should understand
the very concept of fairness in a system in which choices are less than
free-but as a result of taxpayers' own misunderstandings. I begin to unwind these riddles in the next Section.
B. Policy Responses to Uncertainty
At first glance, the phenomenon of cognitive bias seems to undermine
the assumptions of the standard critique of the equity argument and perhaps
to support the SALT deduction as well.7° If taxpayers fail to recognize when
they should move to obtain a more desirable combination of taxes and services, we have little assurance that the taxpayer in high-tax jurisdiction A is
as well-off as the taxpayer in low-tax jurisdiction B. Arguably, then, we
might favor a deduction at least for "stranded" taxpayers, those who pay
more than they get. The difficulty, of course, would lie in identifying the

66.

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 54, at 19.

67. One possible story would rely on the tendency for tax penalties to seem more onerous
than benefits of equal magnitude. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 233. A taxpayer might pay fifty
dollars but feel as though the actual sting is more like one hundred dollars. Cf Lewinsohn-Zamir,
supra note 46, at 390 (observing that citizens misestimate the costs of providing public goods). She
might then demand one hundred dollars worth of perceived benefits in exchange. If there is a jurisdiction that matches this set of preferences (perhaps by providing less of other benefits not valued
by our exemplar taxpayer), she will realize a surplus.
68. See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 15, at 14, 18; Daniel McFadden, Free Markets and
FetteredConsumers, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 5, 10 (2006).
69. See Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of
Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657, 665-66
(2001); McCaffery & Baron, supra note 54, at 53.
70. It is worth noting here that another form of irrationality-racism--also undermines the
assumption that taxpayers have located in order to equalize taxes and benefits. See Vicki Been,
"Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 517-18 (1991).
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stranded. Alternatively, we might simply grant the deduction uniformly in
the hope that on net we will enhance overall fairness by improving the lot of
the disfavored more than we inappropriately reward the already favored. But
that approach is obviously rather rough justice.7'
One cautionary note here is that the deduction might inappropriately reward a fair number of taxpayers, and by a substantial degree. Consider again
the possibility of debiasing. We might think that well-advised taxpayers are
more likely to live in a place that closely reflects their actual preferences'
We should expect that expert counseling services would be most available
(and, given the reduced stakes for low-wage earners, most financially practical) for high-income taxpayers. Thus, while it is uncertain how many lowerincome taxpayers are stranded, it is likely (on this set of assumptions) that
most taxpayers for whom much is financially at stake will not strand themselves. Since the deduction is worth more as income increases, those are
precisely the taxpayers for whom the deduction would most be useful. 71 So
the deduction would tend to flow to taxpayers who are least likely to face
overcharges as a result of cognitive bias.
Obviously these estimates have a strong back-of-the-envelope character.
To make any good predictions about the equity -effects of the deduction, it
appears as though we need better data, not only about how biases affect individual taxpayers, but also about which of these taxpayers is likely to
benefit from debiasing.
A further complication is that one might argue, along the lines of Jon
Klick and Greg Mitchell, that government should not, in effect, encourage
cognitive biases.73 In the absence of government correctives, Klick and
Mitchell argue, individuals may well be obliged to find their own debiasing
mechanisms in order to maximize their expected welfare.74 Government intervention removes this incentive. Thus, just as insurance creates so-called
moral hazards, government correctives for cognitive bias might create "cognitive hazards."75 Similarly, they might argue, providing a deduction for
taxpayers who are disadvantaged by their own biases would undesirably
diminish their motivation to become better informed.
Crucially, the cognitive-hazard argument depends on the assumption that
taxpayers are capable of recognizing the fact of their own bias, or at least
the fact that their prior decisions leave room for improvement. 76 In our

71. For more discussion of the difficulties of this alternative, see infra text accompanying
notes 197-200.
72.

Kim Rueben & Len Burman, Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 108 TAX NOTES

363, 363 (2005); see STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
73.
Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality:Moral and
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); cf. Kahneman & Thaler, supra note 46, at 20
(noting that the fact of biases does not by itself establish the appropriate policy response).
74.

Klick & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1633-41.

75.

Id. at 1626.

76.
See id. at 1626, 1629-33 (explaining the importance of information "feedback" to correcting biases).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:805

example, a taxpayer has to recognize that they need better tax advice before
seeking out the expert who will help them determine whether they have
made the right choice about where to live. Further, it might be that even
those who receive debiasing treatment will nonetheless resist
. 177 it; as tax lawyers know all too well, not every client listens to advice. If taxpayers (or
other decision makers) can't change their behavior, irrespective of government incentives, then choosing a rule that is less advantageous to them is not
welfare maximizing (and might strike some simply as cruel or unjust, in the
way that criminal punishment used to deter an individual mentally incapable
of conforming his conduct to the law would be unjust). Even if we were to
agree with Klick and Mitchell, we would have a set of important subsidiary,
and largely empirical, questions about how readily taxpayers can be debiased.7 8
Although data on the effectiveness of taxpayer debiasing is unavailable,
there is some reason to believe that many taxpayers will not be readily debiased. Anecdotally, at least, taxpayers have no obvious source of feedback to
alert them that they are paying too much for or getting too little from their
state government relative to their personal preferences. Assuming that the
preferences of taxpayers for different amounts and forms of public goods
are relatively diverse, taxpayers cannot easily rely on the behavior of others
to tell them about the satisfaction of their own preferences. 9 Taxpayers
might rely on decisions by others to move into or out of their jurisdictionbut that, of course, is itself tainted by potential frictions that might prevent
any meaningful movement.
Nor does any market participant have a clear incentive to provide feedback in order to benefit from superior, debiased decisions. s Local
77.

S. BECKER,

Cf Jon Elster, More than Enough, 64 U.
ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES

CHI.

L. REV. 749, 754 (1997) (reviewing

GARY

(1996) and arguing that "the very idea of intentional change

of time preferences is incoherent"); McFadden, supra note 68, at 10-11 (identifying problems with
attempts to debias consumers).
78. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1653-56 (acknowledging that the authors' conclusions are to a large extent contingent on unavailable empirical data); cf Nathan Berg & Gerd
Gigerenzer, Psychology implies paternalism?: Bounded rationalit' may reduce the rationale to
regulate risk-taking, 28 Soc. CHOICE WELFARE 337, 340 (2007) ("[T]he policy implications of
theoretical and empirical departures from neoclassical rational choice are indeterminate.").
79. But see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1656 (claiming that irrational behavior often
changes readily in response to education and self-correction). However, reasonable sources of information exist about related issues, such as whether the local government is spending the money
that it raises efficiently. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking,
Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 25, 25-26 (1995) (describing a model in
which voters evaluate incumbent performance by reference to success or failure of officials in
neighboring regions); cf. Andrei Shleifer, A theory of yardstick competition, 16 RAND J. EcON. 319,
319-20 (1985) (suggesting that efficient cost structures of regulated firms could be inferred from
cost structures of comparable producers).
80. My analysis here follows recent economic studies of hidden bundled pricing. Xavier
Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in
Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. EcON. 505 (2006). Many firms impose a variety of hidden charges:
in Gabaix and Laibson's example, some hotels add on hidden costs in the form of extra fees for gym
access. Intemet access, local calls, and the like. Other hotels do not. At first, this was puzzling to
economists. Id. at 506-07. Why would the hotels offering one bundled (and, presumably, higher)
price for everything not expose the hidden fees of their competitors? Id. The answer, it seems, is that
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officeholders, or candidates for office, are unlikely to want to debias their
locked-in constituents. Even the candidate who might benefit from exposing
the underperformance of her incumbent rival may well calculate that in the
long run she is better off not having to deal with the more demanding electorate that would result if she succeeded in both her debiasing and election
efforts. It might be better to chance winning the election on other grounds
and retain more freedom later.8 ' Officials in rival jurisdictions, who might
wish to woo high-income taxpayers to bolster the public rolls, have a similar
dilemma. It may prove difficult to provide clearer information to the taxpayers they are courting without also giving the same information to their own
constituents.
In short, a weak case exists for the deduction as a means of resolving
unfairness to biased taxpayers. We can't say for certain to what extent taxpayers will be biased, or in what direction. Taken as a whole, however,
taxpayers tend to be a bit worse off as a result of biases and other frictions
on their choice of residence. At a minimum, the argument that granting a
deduction would create serious cognitive hazards seems somewhat weak in
this context.
We could, however, craft another objection to the deduction based on a
claim about what it means to be fair to a person laboring under some kind of
cognitive bias. More specifically, we might object that, to the extent the equity argument aims to level subjective well-being between similarly situated
taxpayers, the SALT deduction inappropriately rewards our stranded taxpayer. If the taxpayer perceives herself as being better off where she is than
elsewhere, why give her a deduction?
In order to resolve this question, we must define what we mean by taxpayer welfare or utility. A number of economists, led by Daniel Kahneman,
have pressed for an economic theory in which policymakers will attempt to
maximize "experienced utility"-that is, subjectively perceived satisfaction." Kahneman contrasts this notion with what he calls "decision utility,"

they had nothing to gain by doing so. Id. at 508. Customers tended to split into "sophisticated" and
"unsophisticated" customers. Id. Sophisticated customers already knew about the hidden fees. Unsophisticated customers could not easily be debiased, and if they were, that would only have
prevented the bundled-price hotels from imposing their own hidden fees on the unsophisticated in
the future. Id. at 509. Thus there was no incentive for any market participant to debias. id. at
509-11. For an earlier work with similar implications for debiasing, see William H. Redmond,
Consumer Rationality, and Consumer Sovereignty, 58 REV. Soc. ECON. 177, 180 (2000), which
argues that advertising and easy credit "inhibit the self-corrective leaming process which would
otherwise return consumers to a rational state."
For some tentative thoughts in the economics literature about the implications of these kinds of
findings for political markets, see Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Does the Political Process Mitigate
or Accentuate Individual Biases Due to Mispredicting Future Utility? (Mar. 1, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://Iaw.usc.edu/academics/centers/cslp/conferenceslbpf_04/papers/documents/FreyStutzerMisprediction.pdf.
81.
In this sense, the candidate is similar to the bundled-fee hotel: she does not want to gain
a short-term competitive advantage at the price of sacrificing her long-term opportunities for extracting hidden rents.
82. Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J.
EcON. 375, 379-99 (1997); see Etzioni, supra note 46, at 160; Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden,
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which would measure utility on the assumption that the choices individuals

actually make accurately reflect their preferences.8 The difference is significant if we think that individuals' decisions do not always reflect what would
maximize their own happiness. For example, if a taxpayer falsely believes
that she is residing in the place that will make her happiest, then we as poli-

cymakers have an opportunity to increase her experienced utility by
encouraging her to relocate to somewhere that better satisfies her unexpressed preferences. If we relied exclusively on decision utility, we would

overlook that opportunity.
Turning back to our equity question, one implication of this analysis is
that, under an experienced utility rubric, in a sense the stranded taxpayer is
worse off than one with the same preferences who sees clearly because she

suffers an opportunity cost. Again, our two taxpayers both have the same
preference for, say, the amount of government services each wishes to consume. The stranded taxpayer, however, misperceives the amount she is
paying and receiving and so chooses to live in the wrong state. Thus, even if
her experienced utility at present is identical to the unbiased taxpayer's, she
is worse off, because the stranded taxpayer has a lost opportunity to improve
her experienced utility by moving. To take a silly example, think of the

M&M aficionado who prefers, in order, green, brown, and yellow M&Ms.
She's wearing dark-tinted sunglasses. She is reasonably happy consuming
all brown M&Ms, but simply by taking off the sunglasses, she may discover

that some of her brown ones are actually green. Happy day! 84 So perhaps
equity would still support a deduction for the stranded taxpayer if some taxpayers see clearly and do not receive a deduction. But if we reject either the
notion of experienced utility or the possibility of debiasing, there is no lost
opportunity; and thus both our hypothetical taxpayers are equally well-off.
Notice, too, that the opportunity-cost equity argument assumes that

while taxpayer perceptions may change, their underlying preferences for
Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENV'T & RES. ECON. 161, 162, 167
(2005); Kahneman & Thaler, supra note 46, at 2.
83.

Kahneman & Thaler, supra note 46, at 2-3.

84. This example, although ridiculous, reflects a large literature on the possibility that individuals can possess what appear to be inconsistent or contingent preferences. E.g., JON ELSTER,
SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Kahneman & Thaler, supra
note 46, at 3; Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Aii. 317 (1977). Additionally, preferences may be formed by
individuals' prior experiences so that they are contingent in a different sense-contingent on the
individuals' past. including their past consumption. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 236, 238.
One caveat is that not all shifts in preferences in response to new information result in greater
experienced utility. As Elster argued, many individuals adopt preferences that misrepresent their
highest and best choices because those choices are unattainable, and the feelings of cognitive dissonance and dissatisfaction that might result from frustration may exceed the benefits of pursuing the
higher good. Thus, he writes, "[r]elease from adaptive preferences ...may be good on the autonomy dimension while bad on the welfare dimension." ELSTER, supra, at 138. In the end, Elster
claims that the only meaningful welfare measure is satisfaction of fully informed and autonomous
preferences, so the apparent disutility that we would experience upon release from our self-imposed
misperceptions is no disutility at all when utility is properly measured. Id. at 132-33, 135-36. In
essence, Elster adopts a version of objective utility-utility measured according to what individuals
ought to want, rather than what they express. See infra text accompanying notes 202-208.
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taxes and services do not. It isn't clear that is the case. We know, for instance, that law and individual preferences shape one another.85 Our notions
of what is right or desirable reflect to some extent our feeling of belonging
to a community that has already made decisions about those questions and
enacted some of them as laws.16 Our background socioeconomic status may
affect our willingness to take risks in exchange for money. 7 Thus cognitive
biases may be overlaid on preferences that have themselves changed as a
result of our perception of our cultural setting.88 That might suggest that a

biased market has no opportunity cost. Our M&M eater might take off her
sunglasses and find she no longer cares about the difference between brown
and green, since they've given her the same modest thrill for so long. 9
Ultimately, then, any account of horizontal equity that looks to subjective utility is faced with something of a riddle. How should equity treat
contingent preferences? Should it view them as endogenous? Or must it
treat preferences, like cognitive biases, as an opportunity cost standing between the individual and greater happiness? If the latter, how do we sort
between favored and unfavored preferences? The act of separating preferences to be favored by the tax system from those treated with disfavor
would move us toward a system not of subjective utility at all but instead of
objective or hypothetical utility.9 I consider these problems in more depth in
Part VI.
For now, though, let us reserve the preferences dilemma and assume that
we are interested in subjective utility. Under that view, if information is free
and interstate relocation costless, the deduction partially corrects cognitive
bias. That assumes, though, that not everyone is affected by the bias. Our
primary difficulties thus are administrative. How would we sort out the
stranded from the debiased or well-advised? 9' And, in its current form, the

85.
See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Law as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. I, 22-24; Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE
L.J. 1, 80-83 (1992).
86.

See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 85, at 18-19.

87.

See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 696-721.

88.
See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 59, at 1161, 1192-93 (explaining that the meaning of
the term "preferences" can be unclear when what people want is itself contingent on the perceptual
frame within which their choices are made).
89.
See id. at 1165 (arguing that consumer preferences "might change as a result of consumption"); see also Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 82, at 168-69; Redmond, supra note 80, at
185.
90. By hypothetical utility, I mean a measure of individuals' utility based on satisfaction of
the preferences that they might or ought to have rather than those expressed in an imperfect market
by less than completely rational consumers. See Harsanyi, supra note 45, at 133-34; LewinsohnZamir, supra note 46, at 381 n.9 (explaining that use of hypothetical or objective preferences forms
a major alternative to the use of expressed preferences alone). For criticism of the argument that it
might meaningfully be said that there is more than one utility, see Timothy J. Brennan, A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks,ECON. & PHIL., Oct. 1989, at 189.
91.
See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1245, 1253 (2005) (arguing that behavioral law and economics does not predict when consumer
preferences will be stable and when they will instead be the products of perceptual biases).
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deduction is of relatively little use to precisely those-the uncounseledwho seem to deserve it.
111. MORE ON MOBILITY
We may already have some reason to doubt that taxpayers will sort
themselves neatly into clusters of evenly shared benefits and burdens, even
in a hypothetical world where information about competing jurisdictions is
free and relocation costs are zero. In this Part, I examine what happens when
we relax the latter two assumptions. Information and relocation costs impair
interstate mobility such that the case for the SALT deduction is rather weakened, especially to the extent that it includes payments for property taxes.
There may be more articles by economists about the effects of state and
local jurisdictional competition than there are competing jurisdictions. 9' I
am not an economist and claim no special ability to sort the conflicting
claims of that literature. In general, though, economists now largely agree
that some basic assumptions of the equity critique are flawed. In particular,
substantial barriers impede a taxpayer's freedom to move to another location
where the basket of taxes and services are more to her liking.
First, information about alternative jurisdictions is expensive to gather
and hard to interpret.93 Despite some laudable efforts by courts to ensure that
local governance will remain "transparent," the fact is that some public services are difficult to compare. 94 As we will see, localities have conflicting
incentives on whether to generate data that would be useful to outsiders, and
without local cooperation, critical information may be impossible to obtain.
In addition, because public goods may be bundled in different ways, the
prospect of moving presents taxpayers with significant decision costs: they
have to evaluate not one but hundreds of different potential trade-offs. 9
Even putting cognitive biases aside, a taxpayer is unlikely to be able to
evaluate more than a handful of possibilities, and it is doubtful that this se96
lection will offer her an ideal mix of taxes and benefits. And our brief
survey of the effects of cognitive bias suggests that many taxpayers are
likely to respond most strongly to the most visible or "salient" aspects of a
jurisdiction, such as its tax rate, its employment rate, and perhaps other
fairly straightforward numbers like housing values.97

92.

For an abbreviated roundup, see Stark, supra note 29, at 1410 n.81.

Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 235; see Shaviro, supra note 12, at 964-65.
94. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 236 (observing difficulty for consumers in
identifying the quality of education a jurisdiction produces); cf Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and
93.

Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2001)

(observing that legal scholars have struggled to measure the quality of education services).
95. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 223-25; Shaviro, supra note 12, at 964-65.
96.

See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the

Political Economy of Local Government, in I

PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUB-

LIC POLICY 23, 28 (John M. Quigley ed., 1983).
97.

See Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 82, at 171-72.
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Lastly, moving costs are plainly a substantial friction on taxpayer
movement. 98 Moving costs can include the obvious, such as the costs of
renting a van, and the more subtle, such as lost access to reliable child
care. 99 Informational and moving costs also can compound one another. A
jurisdiction that offers an attractive benefit-burden basket today can change
governments, change policies, and lose key employers or other sources of
revenue. If each move is costly, the wise taxpayer should try to acquire information not only about the current state of a jurisdiction but also about its
future.
More sophisticated economic models attempt to predict how state governments will respond to these imperfect market conditions. For example,
one approach hypothesizes that although the existence of alternative regimes
generally does not directly align taxpayer interests with government regulation, it has a significant disciplining effect on local governance.' °° Voters can
evaluate the quality of their own government by reference to the performance of others.' ° Furthermore, the threat of exit by capital and big revenue
producers so clearly portends future electoral losses that it may be a significant tool for magnifying the political power of those with exit opportunities.
Public officials generally cannot know the extent of the frictions facing their
constituents, so any conditions in which exit is somewhat plausible from the
officials' perspective may result in enhanced influence for those who might
leave. Perhaps that will lead, if not to a perfect alignment of voter preferences and government services, at least to a more efficient delivery of the
services the government does provide. I explore the relationship
of the sub2
sidy arguments for deduction to these models elsewhere. 0
For now, I want to focus on how the likelihood of impaired taxpayer
mobility (absent the possibility of some internal state-government adjustment that reinvigorates the impact of mobility) would cut for the deduction.
Certainly the high costs of learning, deciding, and moving undermine the
assumption that taxpayers get what they pay for. Taxpayers may often be
stranded in a jurisdiction in which they perceive their tax costs as exceeding
their government benefits. Under a strictly welfarist view, these taxpayers
should be entitled to a deduction.
This result may not hold for wealthier taxpayers. To the extent that moving costs are relatively fixed, investing in them becomes steadily more
attractive as the potential gap between taxes and benefits gets wider.
Although wealthy or high-income taxpayers may also consume more services, the gap in absolute numbers between their preferences and what they
pay will likely be larger than a comparable percentage gap for the less
98.

Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 233-34; Shaviro, supra note 12, at 964.

99. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom Low-Income
Mothers' Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029, 104952 (2004).
100.

Besley & Case, supra note 79.

101.

ld. at 30-31.

102.

See Galle, supra note 17.
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wealthy. If we accept this assumption, wealthy or high-earning taxpayers
probably do relocate to equalize taxes and benefits.' °3 Thus the pay-forwhat-you-get critique of the SALT deduction seems to have a fair bit of bite
for just those taxpayers for whom the deduction is presently most usefulthose wealthy enough to itemize and savvy enough about financial matters
to think about tax when making decisions about where to live.
For other taxpayers, frictions do not seem to cut in favor of or against a
deduction. Taxpayers can be stranded in two different ways. Some taxpayers
might live in a jurisdiction where the costs of taxes exceed the perceived
value of services; others will be stuck in a state that delivers services worth
every penny in taxes but at a lower level than the taxpayer would prefer to
pay and get. For the latter group, the costs of relocating may exceed the expected increase in satisfaction they would derive from being able to
purchase more government services (rather than spending money on secondbest choices). No deduction seems appropriate there, since however undesirable the level of costs and benefits, they still net out to zero. That is, the
taxpayer may well be worse off than others, but she is not worse off as a
result of the local tax.'°4 We have no ready way of distinguishing the first
kind of stranded taxpayers from the second. Nor is it clear whether we
should expect to find far more of one sort of stranded taxpayer than another.
Thus, granting a deduction would risk overcompensating a large group of
taxpayers.
Even assuming we could overcome this administrative challenge, frictions weigh against the deduction in another way. In a nation where
interstate movement is inefficient, states can in theory export some of their
tax burden. The possibility of tax exporting is not necessarily a policy outcome to be avoided at the cost of other goals.'"5 But for our purposes, the
fact that some of a jurisdiction's costs are borne by outsiders would weigh
against a federal tax deduction because it indicates that the jurisdiction is
getting more in services than it is paying for. Frictions can facilitate exporting, so evidence of particularly effective frictions might undermine the case
for deductibility.
To see how frictions facilitate tax exporting, let us first take a step back
and imagine a world with no frictions. " 6 Suppose we have a jurisdiction,
Hotel- Tax City ("HTC"), that uses taxes on hotel rooms to export the costs
of its government services to outsiders. Hotel taxes are an especially good
103. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Il-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 420-21 (1990). As Professor Bakija and Professor Slemrod have noted, there is little
empirical work investigating this intuition. Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee From High
State Taxes? Evidence From Federal Estate Tax Returns I n.5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10645, 2004), available at https://wwww.nber.org/papers/w 10645.
104. That is, the fact that the taxpayer cannot obtain her full measure of utility from her expenditures is not the result of her local tax regime but rather of failures in the local private market to
provide goods that would be equally as welfare enhancing at the same price.
105. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 12, at 961-63 (arguing that tax exporting is at least unobjectionable in some circumstances).
106.

The following three paragraphs draw extensively from Galle, supra note 17, at 688-89.
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example of tax exporting since they generally affect the state's own resi7
dents only indirectly. If frictions are absent, this strategy is likely to fail.108
HTC is now a bargain relative to its neighbors, so their citizens will move
into HTC, driving up the cost of real estate, crowding out locals from enjoyment of government services, and driving down wages.' °9 At equilibrium,
the cost of government in HTC and its neighbors is the same.
In the absence of frictions, HTC has a couple of other policy options to
facilitate its exporting goal. First, it can simply pay a cash bribe to prospective immigrants to stay home." ° Obviously the transaction costs of
bargaining directly with every prospective migrant are too large to make that
method viable. There are low-cost methods, however, that have similar effects, such as recruiting a central government to distribute payments to HTC
neighbors that approximate the value of living in HTC, or producing public
goods in HTC whose value "spills over" into neighboring jurisdictions
without much diminishing their value to HTC residents. Even if transaction
costs can be minimized, however, these pseudobribes shouldn't work-no
rational, fully informed carpetbagger will accept a bribe less than the value
of the bargain she'd be getting in HTC.
If we introduce frictions into our tax-exporting nightmare world, bribery
becomes a more appealing strategy. If the benefit of living in HTC is $100,
and it costs $50 to move there, a successful bribe costs only $50, which may
make HTC's tax-exporting scheme economically viable. In addition to moving costs, individuals outside HTC also encounter many of the frictions we
found in the real world: they cannot easily get an accurate estimate of the
value of living in HTC, will tend to overvalue their own entitlements, will
have difficulty integrating the tax and benefit components of HTC's financing, and so on."' Thus, even in a two-jurisdiction model in which bundling
problems are nonexistent and decision costs are relatively low, a successful
bribe probably could be priced considerably below the per capita fiscal advantage of tax exporting. That is crucial for larger models in which
prospective immigrants' points of origination expand far beyond the small
group of neighbors on whom a jurisdiction is able to impose its own costs.
The bribery story seems even more plausible if we think that moving and
information-gathering costs increase with distance: even as the circle of jurisdictions laden with potential newcomers widens, the bribe necessary to
keep them at bay diminishes.
This analysis also implies that states have an interest in deceiving outsiders about the mix of benefits and burdens they offer to their residents. By
107.

See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 911.

108.

See Russell Krelove, Efficient Tax Exporting, 25 CAN. J. ECON. 145, 153 (1992); Gordon

M. Myers, Optinality, Free Mobility and the Regional Authority in a Federation, 43 J. PUB. ECON.

107, 108-09 (1990).
109.

See Krelove, supra note 108, at 153; Myers, supra note 108, at 108-09; cf Shaviro,

supra note 12, at 908 (describing the distortionary effects of tax exporting).

110.

Shaviro, supra note 12, at 908.

Ill.

Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 235; Shaviro, supra note 12, at 964-65.
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increasing information costs and uncertainty, a jurisdiction can lower the
bribe it will have to pay to keep away newcomers. States should want to
spend most on services whose value to outsiders is especially opaqueeducation, for instance, seems a plausible candidate. 2 Particularly savvy
states might consider imposing taxes in a way that seem highly salient to
outsiders-that is, they look like they would obviously apply to the newcomer. And, as I discuss later, a state might voluntarily take on apparent
burdens-for instance, through federal legislation-that it could later
13
lighten through less transparent methods such as administrative lobbying."
If states in fact engage in this combination of behaviors, then (counterintuitively) a deduction might be appropriate for taxpayers in states that
receive payments from other states. Clearly, states that successfully export
some of their costs will not be entitled to claim deductions for their citizens-if anything, they should have to recognize an inclusion equivalent to
their free services. At the same time, states that pay their neighbors' costs
are relatively less well-off than their freeloading brethren, so the equity case
for a deduction for their residents seems strong. As a simple administrative
method for identifying tax exporters, we might look to which jurisdictions
are net bribe payers; the net bribe recipients are the ones bearing an excess
tax burden. Interestingly, in recent years, a consistent set of states have paid
more in federal taxes than they receive in federal largess. 4 Yet those states,
the nation's wealthiest, are also the same states that benefit most from the
present structure of the deduction."' Is the current deduction backwards?
Maybe not. The problem with using net federal spending as a marker for
tax exporters is that there are lots of other reasons that suggest a state might
be a net payer of federal tax. The net payers might just be the losers of this
particular political moment; certainly their electoral-college voters have cast
ballots for the losing presidential candidate in recent elections. 6 Since the
net payers are also the wealthiest states, net payments might simply be an
effect of an overall progressive federal tax system." 7 Even if we could ascertain for certain that the net payments were truly bribes, it wouldn't
necessarily follow that they are bribes to facilitate tax exporting. Bribes and
their accompanying sleights of hand can also be a way for a state that raises
and spends a lot of state tax revenue to prevent free-riding by newcomers,

112.

See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 236; Fennell, supra note 94.

113.

See infra text accompanying notes 133-149.

114. Tax Found., Federal Spending By State Per Dollar of Taxes Paid, 1981-2004 (Mar. 6,
2006), http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/347.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
115. Rueben & Burman, supra note 72, at 363 (listing the top total-dollar recipients of deduction as California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia).
116. Dean Lacy, A Curious Paradox of the Red States and Blue States: Federal Spending and
Electoral Votes in the 2000 Election (Mar. 2, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/hweisberg/conference/Lacy-OSUConf.PDF.
117.

See Rueben, supra note 4, at 500.
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especially newcomers with low incomes.' Without some sort of bribe system in place, the deduction equation might actually flip as newcomers
receive benefits in excess of their tax contributions to the new, wealthier
jurisdiction and the host jurisdiction pays out more than it collects." 9
I acknowledge that my analysis so far departs somewhat from more conventional descriptions of local limits on citizen mobility, which focus on the
use of exclusive zoning to hedge out new migrants, as well as other economic and race-based barriers.' 20 One can, however, tell a similar story about
exclusive zoning, with similarly inconclusive results. The standard account
of exclusive zoning is that localities force occupants to live only on large
lots in single-family homes, so prospective residents will likely have to contribute a large share of property taxes. 2' That tends to increase entry costs
and reduce incentives for outsiders to move in to receive transfer payments. ' As a result, we might be somewhat suspicious that exclusively
zoned jurisdictions will be receiving more in benefits than they are paying
since zoning, like bribes, may offer a low-cost method for imposing frictions
that facilitate cost exporting. At the same time, zoning may simply be a
method for the jurisdiction to prevent free riding, enabling it to realize benefits
at a level equal to, but not necessarily greater than, expenditures. So, while
some grounds exist for casting a closer eye at jurisdictions with exclusionary
zoning practices, we cannot unequivocally say that such jurisdictions deserve no deduction.
We are left, then, to look for some other handy identifier for tax exporters. Fortuitously, the empirical literature suggests one. A well-known study
shows that property values decline in relation to higher taxes and increase in
118. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 212; Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 21,
at 1121-23 & n.39, 1138.
119. Consistent with this theory, the current regressive structure of the deduction roughly
approximates a system in which low-income migrants pay an inclusion while stable, wealthy property owners get a deduction. But that arrangement, too, is wrong if we cannot tell whether the
migrants are moving in order to free ride or instead are responding to efforts to export taxes onto
them. Another possible reason not to tie net payments made to a locality's neighbors to an inclusion
is that in some cases the neighbors are simply leeching. Cf Zelinsky, supra note 33, at 34 (observing
that a decision to live in the suburbs may be based on desire to free ride on expenditures by a
neighboring city).
120. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 51-57
(2001); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2012-13, 2015 (2000); Bruce W.
Hamilton, Property, Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some EmpiricalEvidence, in FISCAL ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS 13 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Mieszkowski &
Zodrow, supra note 21, at 1099.
121. In jurisdictions that are already fully developed, "implicit" or "heterogeneous" zoning
can occur. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of IntrajurisdictionalDifferences in Local Tax
Prices, 66 AM. EcON. REV. 743 (1976); Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 21, at 1140. Absent
some method for hedging out newcomers, demand increases for a relatively fixed amount of housing. Prices then increase until they reach the point where they exactly equal the value of the services
delivered by the jurisdiction. Free riding is thus most likely in intermediate scenarios in which trnere
is room for new housing but less than fully restrictive zoning.
122.

See MYRON

ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS

5 (1997); Fennell, supra note 94, at 80-81.
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relation to education spending.12 The latter implies that the jurisdiction has

actually succeeded in delivering a surplus of benefits over taxes paid by the
homeowner. 24 Of course, a variety of other factors could produce a similar
result, such as irrational responses to school spending as an (inaccurate,
perhaps) heuristic for the value of all local services, or the distortive effects
of the federal mortgage-interest deduction. 25 In addition, other reasons besides tax exporting may enable a jurisdiction to realize excess value. For
example, it may just be very efficient at serving the public. While equity
alone might be indifferent to that distinction, it seems unlikely we would
deliberately want to levy a higher tax on more efficient jurisdictions. Still,
from a strictly equitable perspective, ad valorem property taxes, as a rough
meter of a taxpayer's Senjoyment
of excess government services, should not
•
126

be eligible for a deduction.

In sum, the mobility story is more nuanced than has generally been ap-

preciated. And, again, it is hard to say for certain that we have any
predictable metric for judging whether taxpayers are better or worse off as a
result of their choice of jurisdiction. In the case of property taxes, however,
we might have something of a yardstick, assuming we believe that property
values in fact capitalize, or measure, the excess of government services over
local-government tax burdens. But that is not the end of the story. We might
well think that capitalization reflects not only state taxes and services but
also federal influences. How should we think about those factors in evaluating state taxpayers? The next Part explores just that.

123. Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalizationand the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957,
966-67 (1969). For conflicting views about the enduring viability of the Oates study, compare Been,
supra note 70, at 522-23, which claims that later studies support Oates, with Richard Schragger,
Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1830 (2003), which reviews WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001), and calls results of later studies

"somewhat mixed."
124.

See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 64, at 240-41.

125. See Note, Making Mixed-Income Communities Possible: Tax Base Sharing and Class
Desegregation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1588-89 (2001).
126. In addition, granting a deduction for property taxes paid would be a windfall for property
owners to the extent that owners do not in fact bear the economic burden, or incidence, of the property tax. Cf Michael L. Goetz, Tax Avoidance, Horizontal Equity and Tax Reform: A Proposed
Synthesis, 44 S. ECON. J. 798, 802 (1978) ("[I]f capitalization is complete, an existing tax preference
is not a source of horizontal inequity."). A number of studies suggest that the incidence of the property tax is distributed across all owners of capital. See Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 21, at
1110-17, 1127-31 (surveying the theoretical and empirical literature). That is, investors shift away
from real property as a result of the property tax, bidding up the price of alternative investments. At
equilibrium, investors should be indifferent between property and lesser-taxed investments. Thus
property owners likely suffer a smaller diminution in real wealth (relative to what they could obtain
from investing in anything other than property) than would be suggested by the face amount of the
property tax they pay.
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IV.

EFFECTS OF FEDERAL MANDATES

As the previous Part illustrates, an important consideration in the equity
debate is the possibility of costs and benefits being exported across governments. In addition to imposing costs on one another, states may also
experience so-called vertical cost exporting-they may bear some costs imposed on them by Congress or manage to cause Congress to accept some of
their own costs." 7 So far the legal literature hasn't devoted much attention to
the impact of federal activity on the case for the deduction, notwithstanding
an invitation from Kaplow.121 In this Part, I offer some preliminary thoughts
by focusing on two general phenomena: the fact that federal mandates may
oblige states to spend money to comply with federal policy, and the perhaps
countervailing fact that the federal government often provides grants or
other assistance to states and localities.
A. State Spending...
Consider first the impact of federally imposed obligations on state
budgets. Obviously federal law may require a state to provide rather more
in services than its voters might otherwise have preferred. 29 Indeed, one of
the primary rationales for federal regulation is to prevent capital leakage
from states with a preference for more, and more expensive, regulation to
those with a preference for less. 30 Some states, therefore, may be obliged
to regulate in order to accommodate the regulatory preferences of others.' 3'
While blackletter constitutional doctrine prohibits Congress from directly
conscripting a state's regulatory or legislative apparatus, 3 2 the Constitution
imposes few meaningful limits on federal power to oblige states to meet
generally applicable standards of performance-for example, guaranteeing

127.

See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A FederalismPerspective, 59

VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917,

961 (1985).
128.

See Kaplow, supra note 12., at 428.

129.
Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism:A Critique, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1137, 1231-54 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1356 (1993).
130.
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1951 (1995); Richard P. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Raceto-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1216-17
(1992). Of course, self-interested behavior by federal officials may cntribute to federal demands
for more state-level regulation. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 129, at 1369-89 (identifying politicalprocess failures that may lead to excessive federal lawmaking).
131.
Relatedly, the federal government may impose regulatory mandates to accompany its
grants in order to ensure that the grant serves the purpose of encouraging efficient state regulation.
See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. EcON. LIT. 1120, 1126-27 (1999). As I
discuss in Part V, we would not want taxpayers to be able to deduct the costs of conditions the federal government imposes to encourage efficient state behavior.
132.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-33 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992).
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access to public places for persons with disabilities. 3 1 Congress's power is
especially expansive if the states' duties are tied to a corresponding expenditure of federal funds. 3 4 Under the equity theory, then, the residents of the
low-regulatory-preference states (assuming we could reliably identify them)
could claim a deduction for services they didn't want or value but for which
they now must pay state taxes.
There are some countervailing arguments. First, in some situations it
may be the case that even the low-regulation states desire the "imposed"
regulation but do not value it as much as the potential for luring capital from
elsewhere. 35 For example, the state might have been willing to pay one million dollars to enact a regulatory program, but it might not do so after
recognizing that it can instead attract capital fleeing from regulation in other
states, which will generate more than one million dollars in value in the forbearing state. Federal mandates thus deny the state this opportunity to lure
capital away from others. 3 6 In one sense, taxpayers in these would-be "lure"
states are no worse off for complying with a federal mandate than taxpayers
elsewhere; all have the program they wanted. But the would-be lure states
also have an opportunity cost. That might arguably provide a basis for a tax
deduction for their residents.
Yet once the federal mandate is enacted, every other state also has a
comparable opportunity cost: each one could have poked a hole in the federal dam and caught buckets full of leaking capital. While that opportunity
may have made less proportional impact on the budgets of larger states, its
absolute magnitude was, in theory, similar. Our preliminary diagnosis of
deduction would then disappear. As a result, we have a significant tax administrative challenge: how should we differentiate states that genuinely
prefer less regulation from those that simply prefer to exploit opportunities
to defect from a regulatory regime?
Another possible problem with the equity argument here is that federally
imposed costs may be somewhat illusory. If the goal of nationalizing a program is to prevent outflow of capital or taxpayers, then it likely does not
have to genuinely impose comparable costs on states that are required to
regulate. As we saw in the last Part with the use of federal funds to prevent
in-migration, the appearance or threat of costs elsewhere is probably enough
to assure a fair amount of stability. Residents know their own situation better than they know the lay of the land elsewhere, gathering more information
and relocating are expensive, and cognitive biases may favor the status
133.

See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149-51 (2000).

134. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 460, 484 (2003); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1105-06 (1987).
135. See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 124.
136. That temptation would be especially powerful in small states, where capturing any new
source of revenue might have a substantial effect on the state's bottom line. See Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 64, at 267.
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quo.'1 Thus, it may be that some federal regulations only appear to impose
mandates.'3 8 If so, those states in which the mandate is not truly binding
should have no argument that they are worse off than others and therefore
no argument for a deduction on equity grounds.
There is a credible case that many federal mandates in fact are illusory

in this way. A system in which most costs in states uninterested in regulation
are illusory could be attractive to the enacting, proregulatory majority for
several reasons. Illusory costs are utility maximizing in that they come
closer than full enforcement to satisfying everyone's preferences: the
proregulatory majority can prevent defections from collapsing its own regime but allow those with a preference for less regulation to still go
basically unregulated.' On the pragmatic level, the political cost of enacting a national scheme with illusory costs is rather lower: logrolling debts
will be reduced, 4 0 and the credibility of threats of holdouts' 4 , from fence-

sitters (or credibly self-described fence-sitters) is lower. Similarly, if Congress is purchasing its regulatory power through the Spending Clause, the
costs of buying out minority states will be smaller
if the actual anticipated
42
costs to those states will be greatly lessened.
The enforcement structure of some federal mandates makes this arrangement plausible. Many federal statutes impose what appear to be fairly
clear mandates on states-that they must offer reasonable access to a
primary-care provider, 4 1 guarantee a "free and appropriate education" to all
children with disabilities,'" and reduce ozone to acceptable levels within a

137.

See supra text accompanying notes 48-66.

138. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 218 (describing "measures that appear on their face to
promise vigorous .. regulation but that in the enforcement process amount to little more than mere
words").
139. As Professor Sunstein points out, officials may also want to enact legislation that only
appears stringent in order to simultaneously claim credit for responding to constituent demands for
action and avoid blame from the regulated parties. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory
State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 430 (1990). Of course, this strategy is only effective if the regulated
parties are more attentive to the political process than the constituents demanding regulation. A
number of scenarios make this split plausible. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theor, of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982). This analysis implies that the possibility of illusory mandates also undermines any argument that the deduction is required to account for
overlegislation by self-serving public officials. See Zelinksy, supra note 129. That is, even if federal
officials serve their own ends rather than the public's, they often can do so without imposing real
costs on states.
&

140. For general descriptions of the logrolling bargaining process, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

chs. 10-13 (1962), and William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote
Trading, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1235, 1240 (1973).
DEMOCRACY

141. For a more detailed discussion of the holdout problem, see infra text accompanying
notes 171-174.
142. See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 187 (2004).
143.

42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2006).

144.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(A) (2000).
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given span of years. 45 But the penalty for noncompliance proves to be rather
murky. Under some statutes, such as the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), the primary penalty is the revocation of a vast amount
of federal funds by the administering agency.' 46 That outcome is politically
unlikely for a host of reasons, not the least of which is that states are highly
effective at administrative lobbying.4 4 The actual outcome of these disputes
is likely to be some conciliation process, relatively obscured from public
view, in which the state's ultimate penalty will be far short of the revocation
guillotine stroke. "41 States therefore will often have a substantial degree of
control over the extent to which they are really bound to comply with federal regulatory systems. 49 Depending on the transparency of these lobbying
and conciliation efforts, the degree of that control may not be obvious to
private parties, who may therefore still be deterred from revocation by the
seemingly stem and universal statutory language. And, indeed, groups who
closely monitor IDEA often complain that in practice its requirements for
states tend to prove fairly illusory." °
It might be objected that federal statutes are often privately enforceable,
so it may be fairly difficult for Congress or an agency to control whether or
where a statute has real bite. But in recent years the Supreme Court has increasingly yoked private enforceability to express congressional
authorization.' Even writers who have argued for fairly expansive private
enforcement of federal norms have acknowledged that judicial control over
the existence of a right of action is likely 52to take a back seat not only to
Congress but also to the views of agencies.
In any event, equitable considerations raised by federal mandates will
often be swamped by other factors. For example, at least some national
regulation is enacted because the majority coalition believes that contrary

145.

42 U.S.C. § 7511 (2000); see Sunstein, supra note 139, at 408-10.

146.

20 U.S.C. § 1416.

147.

See Galle, supra note 142, at 193.

148.

See Harold J. Krent, Delegationand Its Discontents,94 COLUM. L.

REV.

710, 717 (1994)

(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)); Jonathan R. Macey,
Public Choice and the Legal Academy, 86 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1080 (1998) (reviewing JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW

(1997)).
149.

Galle, supra note 142, at 193-95.

150.

E.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov-

ernment Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Marca Bristo, Chairperson, Nat'l Council on
Disability) (claiming that federal enforcement actions were not sufficient to encourage states to
comply with IDEA and that a large majority of states were significantly noncompliant).
151.

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285-86 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532

U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
152. See Brian D. Galle, Can FederalAgencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?
A TheoreticalApproach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 206-07, 218-19 (2003); Matthew C. Stephenson,
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative
Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 94-95 (2005).
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behavior is inconsistent with national norms. 3 It seems perverse to grant a
deduction to a state to cover its compliance costs (say, for busing to integrate schools) with a national norm when noncompliance would be morally
objectionable. Equity here gives way to other notions of justice, or perhaps
we simply define a fair basis for comparison between sets of state taxpayers,
with some costs neglected because they fail to meet that baseline. 11 Put another way, it would seem strange if the tax system treated some individuals
as having been disfavored when, in fact, the reason-for their disfavor is because federal law was ironing out some larger inequity. Or, more pithily, tax
law shouldn't reward discriminators.
In short, although some state taxpayers may think they are paying for select federally mandated regulatory regimes, in practice they may not be.
Discerning one situation from another seems administratively arduous. And,
for obvious reasons, Congress would be unlikely to sanction a tax system
that laid bare instances where its threat of national regulation is actually a
bluff. Accordingly, the fact of state spending to comply with federal dictates
doesn't appear to support an equitable basis for the deduction.
B.... And Getting
At the same time that Congress imposes obligations on the States, it also
provides them with significant financial benefits, often as part of the same
regulatory regime.'55 In select circumstances states may be in a position to
demand payment well in excess of their actual costs of compliance with
federal programs. 1 6 National payments may cover the cost of services that
some states would happily have funded themselves, giving the state another
kind of cash excess.'57 Some federal payments, though, may only barely
provide states with services to which they were at best indifferent or may
induce additional expenditures on unwanted services.' 8 Unfortunately, the
administrative obstacles to any equitable result are formidable. 9
The first question we have to answer is whether the money that a state
receives pays for services that in fact improve the subjective well-being of

153. See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Is,,'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1320 (1994).
154.

For an example of one effort at such a definition, see Zelinsky, supra note 33, at 22-29.

155. See Richard Briffault, Public Finance in the American Federal System: Basic Patterns
and Current Issues, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 533, 537-39 (1996).
156.

Galle, supra note 142, at 187-91.

157.

Id. at 186-87.

158.
(2005).

See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2568-69

159. Cf Jeffrey Schoenblum, Taxation, the State, and the Community, 23 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
210, 213-14 (2006) (considering whether net benefits and burdens of tax and government should be
assessed at the individual or community levels).
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the state's citizens. Unrestricted cash payments are fungible, ' and we can
safely assume that in a state with anything like a functioning representative
process, the funds will improve the well-being of at least some of the state's
residents. 16 But few federal payments are unrestricted. Most are earmarked

for use in a particular program, be it health care for seniors, leaving no child
,,162

In effect,
behind, or buttressing the states' readiness for "emergencies.
federal spending looks a lot like a fungible cash gift combined with a federal mandate.16 We can't count cash gifts against deductibility but fail to
consider the impact of accompanying restrictions. Again, we have the puzzle
that bedeviled our treatment of federal mandates: how should we sort welcome regulation from undesired imposition? If the federal mandate is
irksome and unwanted, it ought to offset the benefits of the cash gift. But we
usually can't tell when that happens.
The state delegation's initial vote for or against the initiative does not

solve this problem because we have to consider spending programs not only
year by year but also over time. Law shapes our preferences, so in time,
even an unpopular federal initiative may develop a constituency within the
state. 64 As we saw, states have considerable power to affect the actual costs
of a program as it is applied to them, and plausibly, their power increases
160. David E Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 440, 443-45 (1971); Ronald C. Fisher, Income and GrantEffects on
Local Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and OtherDifficulties, 12 J. URB. EON. 324, 325 (1982).
161.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 861, 874 (1998).
162.

See Briffault, supra note 155, at 543-45.

163. Under classic economic theory, a grant should have almost no effect on state spending.
Because money is fungible, even an earmarked federal grant should simply reduce slightly the price
for all a state's expenditures, in effect redistributing the grant evenly to every beneficiary of state
spending. For example, suppose a state chooses to spend $100 million of its $1 billion budget on
highways. The federal government gives the state $50 million earmarked for highway spending. The
state still prefers to tax its citizens and allocate its resources in such a way that it spends $100 million on roads (or, to be precise, a bit more than $100 million, as a result of the added wealth
represented by the grant). Bradford & Oates, supra note 160, at 444-45; James R. Hines, Jr. &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1995, at 217, 218. The
effect should be that the state reduces its own spending on highways by $50 million and either cuts
taxes by $50 million, distributes the $50 million proportionately among all its other spending priorities, or. more likely, a mix of the two. Fisher, supra note 160, at 328; Oates, supra note 131, at 1129.
For obvious reasons, matching grants change this calculation, as states are willing to spend more in
order to obtain more federal funds. Stephen J. Bailey & Stephen Connolly, The flypaper effect:
Identifying areasfor further research, 95 Pur. CHOICE 335, 336 (1998). In practice, however, the
effect of federal earmarking is often to shift state spending in compliance with the earmark or mandate, even if there is no explicit matching requirement. Fisher, supra note 160, at 329-30 (analyzing
earlier studies); Oates, supra note 131, at 1129. No coherent theory currently explains why states
respond this way to federal grants. Sang-Seok Bae & Richard C. Feiock, The Flypaper Effect Revisited: Intergovernmental Grants and Local Governance, 27 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 577, 583-85
(2004); Fisher, supra note 160, at 324; Hines & Thaler, supra, at 220-22. Thus it is uncertain
whether state spending in response to federal grant conditions increases or decreases actual constituent welfare.
164. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
537, 539-40 (1998); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. EON. PERSP., Fall
1989, at 99, 99-100.
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over time as federal regulators come to rely on their state counterparts for
information, efficient implementation, and political support.'65 On the flip
side, some commentators argue that states can be "locked in" to federal
spending programs as an initial commitment to cooperate with the federal
government becomes too expensive (politically, if not literally) to alter despite increasingly burdensome changes to the program. 66 Unless these two
opposing possibilities happen to balance out perfectly, the initial relationship between a state's subjective welfare and the details of a federal program
will not be a good measure of that relationship in the future.
Still, an objector can reply that most federal spending is reauthorized
every year, and in many programs, the states have the annual option of refusing federal money and the restrictions that come with it. Thus, we
should still have an up-to-date measure of the state's perceived well-being.
The problem here is that many of the decisions we would be looking to under this theory are not in fact decisions about present utility but instead are
bets about future returns-returns when the decision maker next stands for
election. State officials might agree to a program that looks, and in its first
year in fact is, very cumbersome to the state on the assumption that their
administrative lobbying efforts will make the deal turn out for the best by
the next time they have to answer to constituents. Other decisions, such as
the determination whether or not to accept federal funds, might be delegated
to politically insulated bureaucrats more likely to put the state's long-term
fiscal health ahead of momentary political preferences.1 69 For reasons I've
explained elsewhere, that may be a sound state fiscal policy, 7 but it makes
it rather hard to say whether federal benefits and burdens are netting out for
the state's residents in the short run. In any event, the objection relies on the
assumption that subjective well-being does not change between fiscal years.
In addition to this fundamental administrative obstacle, in order to allocate
the deduction equitably, we also have to determine the incidence of the burden
of federal mandates in excess of payments. Recall that federal regulation may
be attractive to some states because it allows them to institute a desired policy without squeezing capital into less-regulated jurisdictions. 7' Often, this
nationalization process is accompanied by federal spending to persuade the
165.

Galle, supra note 142, at 193.

166. Briffault, supra note 155, at 542-43; David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between
Chevron and Pennhurst: A FunctionalAnalysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the AdministrativeState, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1197, 1243-44 (2004).
167.
(2001).

Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, I10 YALE L.J. 1187, 1234

168. See Engstrom, supra note 166, at 1249. In addition to this problem, many federal conditions are attached to a variety of grants, so determining any one day on which a state chooses to
accept the grant and all its associated conditions is problematic. Smith, supra note 167, at 1234-36.
169.

See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105

HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1554-55 (1992).

170.

Galle, supra note 142, at 195 n.244.

171.
See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States'Rights:A Defense of Judicial Review in a FederalSystem, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 94-100 (2004).
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states to adopt programs that they would otherwise be inclined to oppose."'
Payments might lower the political costs of enactment. 3 Alternatively, it
might be the case that Congress must legislate by attaching conditions to
grants because for constitutional reasons the bill would be4 outside Congress'
state.'1
power to enact without agreement by each affected
In either event, the fact that Congress chooses conditional payments
rather than outright mandates may result in a shift of the ultimate economic
burden of compliance away from those who must comply. Consider how
states might respond to an offer of conditional funds. The optimal game theory strategy for each state is complex, especially if the states have
incomplete information about each others' preferences. 7 If legislators are
unable to analyze their strategic possibilities thoroughly, the simplest strategy for an antiregulatory state would likely be to demand more in payment
than the state will lose in negative utility (assuming, by hypothesis at this
point, that that is a measurable number). 7 6 Somewhat more sophisticated
negotiators might attempt to hold up the would-be enacting coalition, demanding that the coalition pay over some of its own excess utility.17 In
either scenario, the burden of the mandates imposed by the regulation is
paid not by those who oppose it but by those for whom the regulation is itself an improvement in subjective well-being. As a result, in order to impose
an inclusion or grant a deduction, we would have to know not only the ex
ante subjective preferences of the various states but also the ex post distribution of costs resulting from the legislative process. And both change
annually.
Thus the fiscal interrelationship between the states and the federal government creates two difficult sets of questions, one related to § 164 and one
rather more broad. First, the flow of grants from the federal treasury to localities, albeit with strings attached, greatly complicates our effort to
pinpoint the comparative well-beings of state taxpayers. Not all decisions to
accept conditional funds in fact represent utility gains for the acceptor. Nor
do all burdens have the weight they purport to have; even the burdens that
genuinely are imposed may actually be borne by taxpayers other than those
whom they appear to limit. Second, and perhaps more significantly, it appears that the deduction might significantly affect federal goals. The next
Part considers those effects in more detail.

172. Hills, supra note 161, at 861, 874; Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignt_; Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 113 (2001).
173.

Galle, supra note 142, at 188-89.

174. Id. The Spending Clause allows Congress to legislate in a variety of ways that would be
beyond the scope of its other delegated powers. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
175. See Galle, supra note 142, at 188-89.
176.

See id. at 186-87.

177. Hills, supra note 161, at 856; Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox of Federalism: The
Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEo. L.J. 461, 476
(2002).
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V. FAIRNESS

IN TAX VERSUS FAIRNESS IN GOVERNMENT?

In the last Part, I suggested that at times tax norms of horizontal equity
might conceivably interfere with other federal policy goals. For instance, we
saw that a deduction for those burdened by federal law would be an odd
result if the entire purpose of the federal law was to strip some benefit from
those who took it unfairly. In this Part, I develop that theme. I also want to
highlight that the SALT deduction may have other less obvious effects on
the dynamic of fiscal relations between local governments and the federal
government.
First, consider some simple ways in which a horizontal-equity rationale
for the deduction would be at odds with federal goals. Under the equity
analysis, we should grant the state's residents an offset against their total
federal tax liability in proportion to the amount of costs that the federal government imposes on them. However, a major reason for enacting regulation
at the national level is to ensure that local actors fully internalize the costs
and benefits of their decisions." Granting a deduction would be completely
contrary to the goal of forcing state actors to bear the full costs of their own
decisions.
Taking account of interstate relationships thus shows us a possible tension between horizontal equity and efficiency. We ordinarily think of
horizontal equity and economic efficiency as being closely related. 7 9 Taxing
two similarly situated parties similarly is not only fair but also usually more
efficient, since the parties will have no incentives to shift positions purely in
response to the tax.'80 In this case, however, focusing strictly on horizontal
equity neglects the possibility of state-imposed externalities.'' We probably
should be willing to trade some equity for increased national efficiency,
which would make everyone, including those who are relatively less welloff as a result of the tax inequity, better-off. In addition, many state taxpayers who can export some of their costs onto neighboring states have no
equity complaint when denied a deduction because they begin from a superior economic position before the costs of the federal regulation are
imposed.
Next, the desirability of a deduction might depend significantly on our
views about the ideal distribution of power between central and local governments. Suppose, for example, that states with preferences for more
regulation
to use for
nationalization
in states
order that
to reduce
leakage.' 2we
If
we allow awant
deduction
citizens in the
prefercapital
less regulation,
178.

See Baker, supra note 130, at 1951; Revesz, supra note 130, at 1216-17.

179.

See Elkins, supra note 10, at 47-48. But see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianismand Hori-

zontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 30-31 (1982).
180.

See DODGE, supra note 23, at 287-90.

181. Cf Elkins, supra note 10, at 48-49 (noting that a tax system may increase economic
efficiency by imposing penalties on inefficient actors and that this penalty may be inconsistent with
pure horizontal equity); Zolt, supra note 29, at 70-71 (observing that taxes imposed to correct for
externalities often cannot be uniform).
182.

See supra text accompanying notes 130-131.
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have in effect imposed a nationalization surtax on the nationalizing states,
since they will bear the tax expenditure cost of the deduction. It seems fair
to assume that the added costs will make national legislation less attractive.
On the other hand, if we can't sort out states' individual preferences, but
instead simply permit the deduction across the board for federally imposed
costs, then deductibility might in some cases subsidize federalization strategies. If, for instance, the states that want more regulation are also the states
with the largest incomes, a deduction might actually shift some of the federal tax burden from the nationalizers to other, lower-income states.183 Either
outcome might seem attractive, depending on whether we'd prefer to penalize or encourage efforts to displace disparate state regulatory regimes with
federal mandates.
But prescriptive federal legislation is hardly the only tool for coordinating federal and state policy. States also use conditional federal spending to
ease the challenges of collective action. As we have already seen, federal
grants may come with strings attached. States can use this structure to permit regulation that would otherwise be choked off by collective-action
problems. 8 4 Suppose that forty-eight states want to tax corporations. Suppose further that the two remaining states are indifferent about corporate
taxation, but they recognize that they could offer themselves as corporatetax havens, drawing large amounts of revenue from their neighbors. 8 5 In all
likelihood, the remaining forty-eight states will not be able to tax corporations, or at least not tax them at near the levels they would otherwise
prefer. 86 This result ultimately diminishes state political autonomy: we have
prevented many states from achieving a desired policy end without fulfilling
any preference of the defectors (other than a preference for exacting rents
where available). However, the forty-eight states have another option: they
tax, thereby precan bribe the two holdout states to also enact a8corporate
7
venting capital from leaking across their borders.
The SALT deduction may interfere with this system by changing the fiscal dynamics between states and the federal government. Suppose that the
deduction will be in place regardless of the individual equity analysis for
each state. Economists have recognized that the SALT deduction may ex-

183. To see why the deduction has this effect, recall that the deduction is generally more
valuable for higher-income taxpayers. It follows that states with more high-income taxpayers will
derive greater value from the deduction, shifting money away from lower-income states. See
STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND THE FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX

184.

4 (2005).

See supra text accompanying notes 175-177.

185. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1586-99 (2000) (describing how tax havens prevent other
nations from setting optimal tax levels).
186.

Id.

187. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax
Havens, Tax Flight, and InternationalTax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (2006) (proposing a
regime in which large nations pay fees to tax havens to persuade them not to act as havens).
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pand the budgets available to states and local governments. 18 This stronger
financial position will likely make it more expensive for a coalition, acting
through Congress, to buy out minority states. ' 89 Intuitively, it seems plausible that a government in greater need of funds will be more willing to accept
federal conditions attached to the funds. Indeed, several scholars have complained that federal conditional spending is unfair to states because it trades
on their financial hardships.'90 While I disagree with the characterization that
these arrangements are unfair-for reasons beyond the scope of this Article-I agree with the underlying claim that bread is more tempting to a
starving man. Some empirical studies by economists appear to support this
dynamic, although the available evidence could be explained in a number of
different ways.' 9' To the extent that the SALT deduction strengthens state
fiscal standing, it also makes conditional spending more difficult.
Whether or not this is a desirable result probably depends on our views
about federalism, or at least about state and local diversity. In at least some
fields, our political process seems to overproduce diversity. 9 2 Deductibility
may be undesirable for those areas, since it will make it more difficult for
states to buy their way to uniformity. And uniformity may sometimes be
necessary to maximize state autonomy, as with our corporate-tax example
above. But these conclusions depend on the details of the institutions that
implement any given policy.'93 A one-size-fits-all deductibility rule would be
unlikely to have the desired effect for all situations.
In short, our views about the deduction's effect on these aspects of federal-state relations seem to turn on debates over whether centralization
enhances or reduces efficiency in government, enhances or reduces individual liberty, strengthens or weakens a meaningful sense of community, and
all the other disputes that generally attach to the question of federalism. Tax
has no obvious answers for them.
Supposing for the moment that we had concrete views about these problems and wanted to employ the SALT deduction to achieve them, strong
counterarguments cut against the deduction as an instrument of federalism.
Viewed at this level of remove, the deduction looks like a very crude tool for

188. See PRESIDENT'S
supra note 131, at 1126-27.

ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note

9, at 83; Oates,

189. For a mathematical model of this prediction, see Craig Volden, Intergovernmental
Grants: A Model of Political Competition in a Federal System 9-22 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestem.edu/meds/papers/econ-volden.pdf.
190. See Baker, supra note 130, at 1933-36; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 135, at 86;
Somin, supra note 177, at 468; Stewart, supra note 127, at 971.
191.
For an in-depth discussion of the evidence and its best interpretation, see Brian Galle,
Federal Grants, State Decisions, 16 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 69-78,
on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=963915.
192.

See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 919-21, 925-26.

193.

See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales

and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA "), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1396, 1402-28 (2007) (analyzing
the effects of choice of institutional form on the tradeoff between diversity and other federalism
values).
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either strategy. For one, it doesn't distinguish between federal programs that
themselves reward and promote state experimentation and those that simply
replace it with one set of uniform rules. 94 Further, Kaplow's criticism of the
deduction's flaws seems especially trenchant here: we could accomplish
these same effects, with none of the distortions and administrative difficulties of the deduction, by simply enacting a law requiring Congress to fund
all of its mandates.
Thus it may be difficult for us to isolate horizontal equity from other
policy considerations. In our effort to ensure fairness for taxpayers in different jurisdictions, we may interfere with other federal efforts at fairness or
efficiency. It might be possible, though, to construct a notion of horizontal
equity in which we can account for these additional effects. For instance, as
we saw with the equity treatment of those the federal government regards as
discriminators, we could set a baseline of "fair" comparisons. In the next
Part, I attempt to sketch one possible such approach to equity.
VI.

BEYOND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING?

Although my analysis over the past few Parts has drifted fairly far in different directions, it has one strong undercurrent: it is extremely difficult to
reach fine-grained, or at times even coarse, conclusions about the welfare
effects of local government on different taxpayers. Some of the obstacles
seem unique to local government, as with the effects of federal grants. Yet
others, such as doubts about whether consumer choices maximize consumer
welfare, call into question whether utility analysis can be a coherent tool for
tax policy generally. The dilemma of measuring and comparing individual
welfare is not unique to the SALT deduction, and tax theory has previously
hazarded some rough solutions. In this Part, I suggest that most of these solutions also leave us largely unable to compare taxpayers based on their
welfare. Some new approaches may be more workable, but, importantly,
these approaches appear limited to SALT and other deductions like it.
One common response among tax theoreticians to the problem of divergent individual wants and behavior is to assume that we can simply average
away the differences. Consider the Buddhist monk and the exceptionally
venal millionaire. A basic assumption of vertical equity-that is, of tax policy's treatment of distributive justice-is that money has declining marginal
utility.' 95 My first dollar is worth much more to me than my millionth. But to
the monk who renounces all worldly concerns, consumes only donated rice,
and lives on a mountainside, the first dollar is subjectively worth much less
than the millionth dollar to the venal millionaire.
Many economists, especially those working in the optimal-tax tradition
associated with James Mirrlees, deal with this difficulty by assuming an

194. 1 elaborate on this point in more detail in my discussion of the subsidy arguments for and
against the deduction. Galle, supra note 17, at 696-701.
195.

DODGE, supra note 23, at 301-06.
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identical utility function,
. •.
196 such that in our minds there are, in effect, neither
monks nor millionaires.

No doubt the monks would approve.

Other commentators justify this approach by resorting to a wave of the
administrability broom: the presumption of declining marginal utility is a
reasonably accurate baseline that may miss some nuance but is easier to
administer than more accurate measures. 1 97 Instead of identical utility functions, this view posits that deviations from the average utility function are
evenly distributed throughout the population. Thus, formulating policy as if
everyone is identical will result in no net change to total welfare since those
who are overrewarded average out with those who are undercompensated by

any given policy choice. This assumption is very useful for economic modelirg, since it greatly reduces the mathematical complexity of any model.
And from the perspective of an individual taxpayer, the odds of being
treated either too generously or not generously enough should be equal.
Our recent encounters with the SALT deduction suggest that such generalization may be unsatisfying when we begin to peer very closely at the
fairness of the tax system for each individual. 98 The claim that individual
differences can be averaged away, or that an individual can expect an equal
chance of being either over- or underrewarded by the tax system, puts pressure on empirical measures of real utility curves.' 99 What, for instance,

becomes of the assumption of declining marginal utility in a society with
lots of monks or venal millionaires? Similarly, as we saw with the SALT
deduction, there may be unexpected distortions away from our baseline as-

sumptions. Gathering enough information to give us confidence about the
likelihood of an even distribution is challenging because (at least in the experienced utility model) the self-reporting or behavior of individuals who do
not know what would maximize their own utility is likely unreliable.2 re

196. The foundational article in optimal-income-tax theory is J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in
the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). For a lawyer-friendly
summary of optimal-tax theory, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure:A New Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1946-58 (1987). On the
assumption of identical utility functions, see id. at 1947.
197.

See DODGE, supra note 23, at 305-06;

DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN

27-32 (2000);
Bankman & Griffith, supra note 196, at 1947-48; Musgrave, supra note 29, at 6 n.4, 8-9, 14 (examining various compromises that administrable measures of equity demand).
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY

198. Cf. Musgrave, supra note 29, at 16 (arguing that presumption of identical utility functions is too inaccurate to be satisfying grounds for tax theory); Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost
Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Income, 45 TAx L. REV. 215,
224-26 (1990) (claiming that, while it is administratively necessary to use income or consumption
as proxies for well-being, tax policy should still be "guided by the goal of approaching as closely as
possible what we believe are the underlying subjective realities").
199.

See BLUM &

KALVEN,

supra note 29, at 53.

200. Even in a world of rational actors, designing a tax system based on utility is difficult
because individuals who are taxed based on their reported or observed utility will obviously have
incentives to underreport. A variety of economists have imagined theoretical solutions to this problem, with generally mixed results. See Fried, supra note 29, at 170-72 (summarizing and critiquing
Lindahl, Samuelson, and Tiebout).
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One potential response to these uncertainties could be to adopt a set of
second-best rules. We can expect that our tax rule will sometimes fail to
correspond with an individual's actual utility. In the SALT context, we may
have false positives that can sometimes erroneously grant a deduction when
the taxpayer's local government delivers to her more than she pays. Other
errors will be false negatives that can deny deductions that in theory the taxpayer deserves. While we may be unable to predict precisely when these
errors will occur, we can derive a second-best outcome based on which form
of error we would prefer to avoid. Suppose we suspect that overpaying taxpayers are likely to be worse off than underpaying taxpayers, as they will be
less likely to be wealthy. If we are more concerned about the welfare of
those who are less wealthy (for instance, if we believe in the declining marginal utility of wealth), we might well set a rule that tended to overpay.
Unfortunately, these forms of error-avoiding, second-best rules still demand a fair amount of infonnation. Second-best judgments will turn on
matters of degree. We might care more about false negatives, but not to the
point that we are willing to overpay by billions of dollars to avoid them.
Thus, we are likely to be uncomfortable even with our second-best rule
unless we have at least ballpark guesses about the size and direction of each
kind of error. At present, though, our empirical uncertainty about the welfare
effects of consumer choice, particularly the effects of policy responses to
irrational consumers, is such that we may not even be in the parking lot of
the ballpark.
Another tactic for rehabilitating welfare comparisons could be to reconceive the meaning of utility. Arguably, the only truly thorough account of
tax fairness grounded in utility theory would have to resort to objective or
hypothetical utility. By objective utility I mean the satisfaction that an individual, in the policy analyst's judgment, ought to derive from a particular
choice or situation. Assuming, as Kaplow does, that purchase price equals
subjective utility moves in this direction.20 ' But markets may be distorted by
102
cognitive biases, collective-action problems, and other familiar devils. 2 3
Objective utility describes purchase price in an ideally functioning market. 0
Kaplow, supra note 12, at 439; see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 65, at 1191 (not201.
ing the authors' "reliance on behavior as an indication of welfare").
202.

See supratext accompanying notes 48-67.

See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the theory of rationalbehaviour, in UTILITARIANISM
39, 55-56 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); Kaplow, supra note 47, at
504; cf Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 46, at 379, 394 (arguing that consumer prefercnces should be
assessed in light of how those preferences would be expressed absent collective action problems).
For alternative notions of objective utility, see ELSTER, supra note 84, at 125-40, which claims that
a meaningful measure of welfare requires the satisfaction of fully autonomous choices; MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 150-55 (2000), which argues that preferences are
simply an "epistemic" tool for identifying central human capabilities and universal values; and
Amartya K. Sen, Women, Technology and Sexual Division, TRADE & DEV., 1985, at 195, which
develops an argument that welfare measures should include not only mental states but also human
"functionings" and "capabilities." For a helpful overview and critical discussion, see T.M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 108-43 (1998). As an additional note, objective utility should not
be confused with what Professor Kahneman labels "objective well-being," which in his usage refers
to "happiness data" from self-reporting, brain imaging, and the like. Daniel Kahneman, Objective
203.

AND BEYOND
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Alternatively, hypothetical utility might measure relative utility according to a fair set of judgments that would be equally acceptable to every
participant.2 0 For example, given that we would likely want to maximize
society's available resources if we did not know our future social position or
preferences, we may favor efficient over inefficient outcomes. 25 But at the
same time, we would recognize that money typically does have declining
marginal value, thereby making a fair degree of progressivity in the distribution of benefits and burdens desirable.0 9
A possible difficulty for both of these approaches is that they are not
utilitarian, or at a minimum they contravene some core goals of most utilitarians. Both seem likely to produce a handful of relatively uncontroversial
propositions, such as our earlier conclusion that committing racial discrimination should not be grounds for a deduction. Beyond that common ground,
though, it can be plausibly argued that the policymaker's selection of criteria
on which to judge what taxpayers objectively should or hypothetically
would value cannot be value neutral. Instead, it will reflect the preferences
of the policymaker
rather than the individualized value orderings of each
207
consumer. Some commentators would find this unproblematic inasmuch
as they believe that the tax system should reflect an overall vision of social
justice, even if that vision is contestable. 2°8
Others, however, might object that these approaches are not true to the
aims of policy analysis grounded in theories of utility.'°9 Utility has both a
practical and a deep moral contribution to the study of equality. On the practical front, measures of utility based in actual behavior permit more
academic rigor. We can remain open to gathering information about what
individuals want without clouding our analysis by presupposing the anHappiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Daniel Kahneman et

al. eds., 1999).
204.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136-42 (1971).

205.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 453-54 (3d ed. 1986).

206.

See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 196, at 1953-66.

207.
See James S. Fishkin, Justice Versus Utility, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 266, 269-70 (1984)
(reviewing UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982)); Kaplow,
supra note 47, at 509 n. 1; cf Donna M. Byme, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIz. L. REV.

739, 753 (1995) (explaining that interpersonal utility comparisons are difficult, in part because they
invite the comparer to supply her own standard for comparison); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 46,
at 381 n.9 ("[lit may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all."); Sunstein, supra note 50, at 222 ("[lit may be impossible to describe something as a
Ipreference' without undertaking some controversial normative tasks."). But see Harsanyi, supra
note 45, at 142-44 (arguing that hypothetical utility can be neutrally measured by observing behavior of other similar individuals).
208. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 10, at 38-39; Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax
Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of PersonalInjury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1115, 1152-55, 1158.
209. 1 include in this group both strict utilitarianism as well as "welfarism" writ more broadly.
They differ insofar as utilitarianism is indifferent to distributions of utility except to the extent that
such differences impact individually experienced utility, while other forms of welfarism may take
utility into account but also factor in considerations about the most desirable distribution of utility.
For a more in-depth account, see Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and
Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 291-95 (2006).
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More philosophically, utility can claim to honor equality by giving

equal weight to the expressed desires of each individual rather than devalu-

ing those preferences deemed by the policymaker inconsistent with
"objective" preferences."' We might doubt, for example, that a researcher or
policymaker could determine what an "ideally" functioning market comprises without injecting her own vision of social justice."'
It is difficult to say, then, whether the move to objective or hypothetical
utility resolves our problem or broadens it. Quite possibly, the swamp in
which we now stand hip deep should weigh against the allure of utilitarian
analyses, at least when it comes to horizontal equity. There seems little point

in arguing that we have unfairly treated like taxpayers if we cannot agree
how to fairly compare them. Can we narrow the field, by asking whether
either the objective or subjective approach to utility is inconsistent with the
overall project of horizontal equity? Unfortunately, at present, no consensus

exists on what purposes the horizontal-equity norm in fact serves, whether
those norms are coherent in their own right, or whether they instead must
21 3
rest on some underlying and contestable theory of distributive justice.
24
Thus, perhaps it is horizontal equity, not utility, that should be in peril. '
But before we abandon hope, two other potential moves, each arguably
less problematic than objective utility, might still do useful intellectual
work, if only in the limited context of benefits and burdens received from
state or local government. First, we might consider measuring the utility of

210. See Stiglitz, supra note 179, at 36. On the other hand, one could also respond that ignoring the problems of expressed preferences and assessing "utility" solely on the basis of actual
consumption is itself not a neutral choice. E.g., Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 514-15, 521 (1997); see also
BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 29, at 69 (arguing that the "ostensibly scientific" approach of measuring consumer behavior "frequently conceals a normative judgment either about the way people
ought to value money or about the social value of typical expenditures at different levels of income"
(footnote omitted)).
211.
rism).

See

NUSSBAUM,

supra note 203, at 117 (noting this possible argument in favor of welfa-

212. See Schoenblum, supra note 159, at 223, 230 (arguing that experts and bureaucrats cannot be trusted to make objectively correct tax-policy decisions, while also asserting that this same
problem applies to efforts at employing utilitarianism); cf Stiglitz, supra note 179, at 38-39 (arguing that horizontal equity may be a check against distortions of utilitarian analysis within the
political process). It should be noted that at least one of Rawls's explicit goals was to counter this
argument by appealing to claims that "all can accept." John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 247, 248
(Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 1997); see McCaffery, supra note 29, at 75-76.
213.

For a selection of the various perspectives on this front, see supra note 10.

214. In a future work, I will offer a freestanding justification for horizontal equity. For now, it
is perhaps sufficient to say that we could think of horizontal equity as expressing our belief in a
default presumption in favor of the existing status quo distribution, and that this default presumption
is useful to the extent that it represents an incomplete agreement to formulate tax policy while taking as given all of the surrounding facts and preferences of society. Viewing the goals of equity in
this way, we might see significant difficulties in invoking any single notion of hypothetical utility
across state boundaries. The states, after all, are themselves sovereign in some sense. Therefore, a
question exists as to whether one single policy judgment about the appropriate measure of utility is
consistent with our ideal of state individual political sovereignty.
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taxpayers from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective.2 '5 That is, we
might consider whether the taxpayers under comparison took certain risks
which offered comparable expected average utility before the result of the

risk was known.
This argument is common in the law of takings 2 6 Individuals acquire
property knowing that they are subject to the risk of legal regulation that
will reduce the value of their investment. Over the long-term, however, we
expect that a fairly constituted government will deliver, at worst, an equal
distribution of gains and losses. 2 7 Viewed from the ex ante perspective, the

owner who suffers a taking has been treated no differently than any other
property holder; all took a similar risk of suffering temporary, disproportionate losses. 2 1 Alternatively, from an efficiency perspective, compensation

may encourage overinvestment in risky bets. 219 We could similarly say of
state and local taxpayers that each is equally likely to experience temporary
losses in welfare in excess of gain from their government, and that, having
freely accepted that risk in choosing her jurisdiction, the taxpayer has no
equitable or efficiency claim to ex post compensation in the form of a de120
duction.

215. For an overview of the ex ante-ex post question in welfare theory generally, see Adler &
Sanchirico, supra note 209, at 285-322. For contrasting views of its application, compare Donald T.
Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critiqueof Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 562, 595-98 (1992), with Kaplow, supra note 10, at 143-48.
216. For the early definitive work, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
217.

RAWLS, supra note 204, at 380-81.

218. See SHAVIRO, supra note 197, at 18; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality
of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PuI. AFF. 283, 294 (1981).
219. That is, if an owner knows she will be compensated for takings or other losses, she will
invest in property at risk of loss without respect for that loss, even if society would be better off if
she avoided investing. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 596-97 (1984); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 531, 541 (1986). There is considerable nuance to this
claim. See Barbara H. Fried, ExAnte/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 129-31 & n.ll
(2003); Kaplow, supra, at 536-50.
220. See Barbara H. Fried, Compared to What? Taxing Brute Luck and Other Second-Best
Problems, 53 TAX L. REV. 377, 393-94 (2000) (identifying a similar argument but disagreeing with
some of its premises); Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1834-35
(1985); cf Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 209, at 361 (noting that ex ante equity analysis of capital
gains taxation might be indifferent to distributive consequences of divergence between winning and
losing investments); Stiglitz, supra note 179, at 1-2 (pointing out the possibility of defining horizontal equity in tax by reference to ex ante distribution of probable outcomes). Key to this argument is
the point that if individuals are aware of the extent of the risks they run, they can insure against
them. Thus, if risk is disproportionate to insurance, negative ex post outcomes result from a choice
not to insure. See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 209, at 285-322 (explaining conditions in which
this would likely hold true).
Some commentators have argued that state taxes should be deductible to the extent that they
are redistributed to others, on the ground that those funds are not consumed by the taxpayer. Boris 1.
Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits,and Subsidies for PersonalExpenditures, 16 J.L. & EcON.
193, 200-01 (1973). However, the extent to which transfer payments really do not benefit the transferor, even ex post, is questionable. See DoDGE, supra note 23, at 103; MURPHY & NAGEL, supra
note 10, at 145-48.
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Commentators offer some strong arguments against this strict nocompensation view, but at least some of their claims have less force in the
special case of state and local taxes. One familiar objection is that compensa22
tion may encourage individuals to engage in efficient behavior.
S221 , We tend to
think that people avoid risks when they cannot obtain insurance. Inother
223
instances, individuals may irrationally overestimate risk and so overinsure.
Both of these outcomes are socially undesirable. Even if individuals are insured against risk and act rationally, they may "underrisk" from a social
perspective if externalities are involved. Thus the promise of compensation
can serve as a form of insurance or as a method for paying people to take larger risks than their own personal gains would merit.
It is hard to tell this welfare-enhancing compensation story about
§ 164. In theory, the availability of a deduction, either in all cases or in
those instances where government burdens can be shown ex post to exceed
benefits, should encourage us to be "riskier" in our choice of governments.
We might be more willing to move to a jurisdiction that offered services we
are uncertain we will appreciate or that are of dubious quality, knowing that
the deduction will soften the blow if we choose wrongly. This enhanced
willingness to move and experiment could produce positive externalities for
others, particularly if it has the effect of rewarding innovative government.
On the other hand, the deduction might simply reinforce our inertia, since5
staying at home, too, is a risk: a risk of regretting foregone opportunities.1
Further, without knowing the exact degree of our risk aversion and the deduction's effect on it, granting a deduction might produce excess risk. We
might become so indifferent to the hazards of bad local government that we
underinvest in our efforts to learn about it, engage with it, and change it.
That, obviously, would likely reduce overall social welfare.
Another established critique of the no-compensation rule, albeit one itself subject to much debate, is that it is unfair to attach moral consequences
to some kinds of risks. For instance, it might be argued that since everyone
must eat, it would be unfair to hold individuals strictly to the consequences
of the risks they run in obtaining just enough sustenance to survive. Similarly, one could say that only genuine, freely chosen risks should have moral
221.

Fried, supra note 219, at 145-46, 148; Kaplow, supra note 219, at 549-50.

222.

See Kaplow, supra note 219, at 596.

223.

See Fried, supra note 219, at 157-58; Kaplow, supra note 219, at 549.

224. One might also argue that ex ante utility is a poor fit for our tax system generally. After
all, we permit deductions for losses on investments, I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (2000), when it might be said
that on average the investment was simply a bet that failed to pay off. It should follow, as a matter of
ex ante utility, that the loser is no worse off than one whose investments gain and should be entitled
to no deduction. Since this is not the law, the argument would go, we can conclude that our law
generally rejects the use of ex ante measures of utility. It is possible, however, that our decision to
grant the deduction reflects not a purely equitable analysis but rather a calculation that in the absence of a deduction, individuals would underinvest. Cf Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave,
Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. EcON. 388, 389 (1944) (explaining that in
the absence of deductibility for losses, individuals will choose less-risky investments than they
would absent tax).
225.

See Galle, supra note 17, at 696-701.
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consequences.
Eventually, as Barbara Fried has suggested, this type of
claim reduces to the argument that individuals should be compensated for
221
rationally undertaking reasonable or prudent but not unreasonable risks.
The reasonableness prong here looks to be a reformulation of our earlier
discussion of objective utility, while the rationality requirement poses again
the question of how government should best respond to behavior that appears in one sense or another irrational. Thus it looks as though ultimately
the move to ex ante measures of utility leaves us mired in the same spot as
our earlier efforts.
My last effort at salvaging a useful measure of the horizontal equity of
gains and losses from local taxation begins by returning to the notion that, in
the long-term, we should expect a fair government to deliver a roughly even
proportion of benefits and burdens to all its constituents. If we accepted this
view, the equity case for the deduction would likely be much weaker. Recognizing year-by-year deductions or inclusions would fail to acknowledge
that each state government will ultimately smooth out temporary ups or
downs for each taxpayer, and that states are treating each taxpayer the same
regardless of momentary bottom line. That would be true regardless of
whether we were measuring ex ante expected utility or ex post actual welfare.
Note, though, that reaching this result would require two important assumptions. First, we would have to attach a very strong presumption of
justness to the outcomes of state taxation and regulation. For example, even
if the average expected return to all citizens of a given local regime is net
positive, there still may be some large net losers. In order to refuse the claim
for deduction by these unfortunates, we would have to assume either that in
the end what appears an injustice will be made right as to those persons or
alternatively that we will refuse to second-guess the locality's decision to
leave some losses as they fall.
Second, we would have to presume either that the locality would correct
for the effects of the time value of money or that the federal system would
be indifferent to it. For instance, if our taxpayer A is a net loser in year one
but expects to be a winner in year five, she is still worse off than taxpayer B
in the reverse situation because taxpayer B can invest her year-one gains. 28
So we would have to assume that the year-five gains that A realizes will be
enough to offset the fact that they arrived later while her losses arrived earlier. Alternatively, the decision to impose no tax and grant no deduction
could rest on a decision to make the federal choice of temporal justice sec-

226. See Fried, supra note 219, at 136-49, 157-58; Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2300-03 (2003).
227. Fried, supra note 219, at 157-58. For example, a strict utilitarian in a society in which
distribution is unimportant would say that there is no difference between the ex ante and ex post
views because overall utility is the same in either. See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 209. at 334.
Thus before we can critique either view, we must first specify a social-welfare function with some
distributive component.
228. See Stiglitz, supra note 179, at 30 (observing that the opportunity for savings implies that
lifetime smoothing of year-to-year inequalities may still be inequitable).
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ondary to local choices. That is, we could simply accept the state government's claim that its overall system is just, irrespective of any "failure" to
strictly account for time effects.229

By itself, tax theory does not supply any clear justification for why we
would make either set of assumptions, but tax aficionados may notice that
this approach bears some strong resemblances to the tax treatment of loans.
In theory, we might tax "income" from a loan at the time it is received and
grant a deduction at the time of repayment. Instead, however, genuine loans

with market-rate interest result in no tax for cash-method taxpayers. 23° Al-

though this may •not
fully
capture the welfare effects of the loan, especially
•
231

in times of inflation,

the administrative costs of determining the welfare

effects more precisely would likely exceed the gains to individuals of more
accurate assessment . 2 This assessment, though, depends on an assumption
about the relationship between the lender and borrower: it assumes that the

transaction is at arm's length, so that most risks of inflation or default are
reflected in the pricing (for example, in the interest rate) of the loan.233
A no-deduction rule for state and local taxes would rest on a similar type
of assumption about the relationship between individuals and their government. It would assume, as I said, that local government is "fair," such that
the occasions on which losses will on net exceed gains are so rare that they
are administratively not worth determining. Quite possibly our commitment

to state sovereignty, or the constitutional guarantee to states of a republican
form of government,234 obliges the national government to make that assumption as a general rule. But just as the rule for loans has exceptions

where its assumptions break down, 235 so too it is possible that our presumption against local unfairness in certain situations might be so likely to be
unjustified as to merit a deduction. For instance, the Court and scholars have
famously described many constitutional violations as cognizable where the
fair processes of government fail. 2 16 It might follow that there should be a
229. Cf Zolt, supra note 29, at 93-94 (arguing that use of horizontal equity to evaluate annual
tax assessment may be misguided since justice in distributions often happens over period of years).
230. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983).
231. See Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income from the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1160 n.5, 1163-64
(1978) (describing reasons loans may change in value during the life of the loan).
232. See id. at 1165-66; Joseph M. Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing
and Liabilities, or Why the Accrual Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 VA. TAX REV. 245, 248, 280
(2006).
233. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY
286-87 (3d ed. 2004); see I.R.C. § 7872 (2000) (treating portions of certain below-market-interest
loans as income).
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. I am grateful to Ron Pearlman for suggesting a version of this
argument.
235. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 233, at 288-90, 299-300 (providing examples of belowmarket loans and phantom repayment obligations); Bittker & Thompson, supra note 231, at 1187
(providing the example of cancellation of indebtedness).
236.

That, of course, is the classic account of the basic justification for judicial review formu-

lated by John Hart Ely, among others. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Frank I.
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deduction for individuals who are victims of constitutional wrongs inflicted
by their local government. Conceivably the federal government, if it so
chose, could then file a suit against the actual wrongdoer to recover its lost
funds.
In the end, it may be possible to resolve the problem of horizontal equity
among state and local taxpayers, but perhaps only by assuming that any differences among the taxpayers are typically too small to be worth notice.
That assumption, to the extent it is contrary to fact, depends on a theory of
relations between the federal government and the states external to tax theory itself. As a result, we must once more confront our vision of nationhood
before we can answer our tax question satisfactorily. Alternatively, we can
confront the issue of tax equity head on. But there our problem grows from
defining nationhood to defining justice more broadly or to deciding to adopt
some notion of horizontal equity that is independent of controversial justice
norms. In a work in progress I essay the latter. For now, it is likely that tax
theory, standing alone, cannot satisfactorily answer whether either the income tax or the AMT tax base ought to grant a deduction for taxes paid to
state and local governments.
CONCLUSION

In large measure my analysis here has confirmed the received wisdom
that the equitable case for a deduction for state and local taxes is tenuous.
But in a sense it now seems that the purely theoretical equity case for the
SALT deduction is stronger than its critics, including even Kaplow, have
recognized. Where once it was said that paying SALT is simply a freely
chosen consumption choice, such that no deduction could ever be justified,
there now is at least a possibility that, depending on empirical findings,
some deduction could be warranted.
For example, a deduction or credit may make some sense for taxpayers
unable to correlate state burdens with state benefits due to cognitive biases
and other frictions. To be sure, we cannot confirm that claim without a better understanding of how taxpayers connect state taxes with state services
and how those processes change in response to the grant of a deduction.
Further, to make the deduction theoretically coherent, we need a way to ensure that its benefits flow primarily to those who in fact are stranded rather
than to those with access to good tax advisers. We don't have strong enough
data to establish whether these frictions are sufficiently predictable to justify
a tax rule in one direction or another, and as a result we may prefer to invoke a theory of welfare that would ignore any such differences. But that is
not the same thing as saying that no such data can ever be gathered.
On the other hand, I have also shown that the equity case for certain local taxes may be weaker than for others. In particular, ad valorem local
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659. That is not to
say that the theory is without its own problems. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42
OH 1OST. L.J. 131, 134-37 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980).
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property taxes probably should not be deductible under traditional equity
analysis. Property values seem in some cases to be a meter for local taxpayers' consumer excess, so granting deductions for higher property taxes
would be rewarding exactly those taxpayers whom theory suggests should
be paying higher, not lower, federal taxes.
Given the vast budget space allocated to the deduction each year and the
centrality of § 164 in debates about the AMT, these two conclusions are
worthy of note standing alone. But my analysis here suggests some larger
questions.
First, the choice to deduct state and local taxes has ramifications far
more wide reaching than individual fairness to taxpayers. Neither the economic nor legal literature has fully considered the extent to which the SALT
deduction (or its absence) could undermine (or strengthen) efforts to promote nationwide uniformity (or diversity). If we think that the choices
between diversity and uniformity and between experiment and certainty
should arise out of the political marketplace or out of free bargaining between the states (through their agents in Congress), then the deduction
distorts that market, generally in favor of diversity. That result is usually, if
not universally, unfortunate. Thus the deduction should have a place in debates about the appropriate distribution of authority between the states and
the federal government.
Finally, this Article raises some questions about the very possibility of
making meaningful comparisons between individual taxpayers. If I am
wrong about the possibility of better understanding taxpayer irrationality,
then it may follow that we cannot definitively establish the welfare effects of
any kind of consumer choice. As we have seen, there are some modulations
of welfare theory that might allow us to make use of utility as a tax yardstick. But the most effective of these turned on special regard for the
decisions of state and local governments. It remains questionable whether
any of these efforts can serve outside that particular context. Whether horizontal equity as a concept can be rehabilitated in the face of these
uncertainties remains a task for another day.

